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Few decisions have been more eagerly awaited by lawyers interested in
class actions than that of the United States Supreme Court in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.' During the years preceding Shutts, courts had
found themselves increasingly presented with problems of personal juris-
diction and choice of law in multistate class actions.2 Suits on behalf of
1. 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). For an excellent critique of the Court's opinion, see Kennedy, The
Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State
Multistate Class Action, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 255 (1985).
2. Before Shutts, a substantial literature had developed on the subject, reflecting diverse and in-
consistent scholarly opinion. For an excellent general discussion see Kamp, The Multistate Consumer
Class Action: Local Solutions, National Problems, 87 W. VA. L. Rav. 271 (1984-85); Kennedy,
Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 3 (1983); Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class
Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV. L. REv. 718 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Multistate
Class Actions]; Note, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class: A Problem ofJurisdiction, 25
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claimants scattered throughout the United States and foreign countries
had become commonplace,' in part because more sophisticated litigation
management techniques4 made courts and lawyers more disposed5 to re-
gard the class action as an efficient vehicle for resolving disputes.'
Significant controversy remained, however, concerning whether a forum
lacking a traditional basis of jurisdiction over a class of nonresident plain-
tiffs could properly adjudicate their claims without their affirmative con-
sent." Almost a half-century ago, in Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme Court
had hinted in dictum that it could adjudicate such claims.' A few years
later, however, the venerable case of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton 9 set forth the well-known minimum contacts test.10 This test originally
was designed to establish due process limits on the assertion of judicial
power over defendants.1 ' But since class plaintiffs have claims that are
HASTINGS L.J. 1411 (1974); Note, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction over
Class Actions, 56 Tax. L. REV. 1033 (1978); Comment, State Court Jurisdiction over Multistate
Plaintiff Class Actions: Minimum Contacts and Miner v. Gillette, 69 IOWA L. REv. 795 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S.
914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d
1177 (App. Div. 1976); Klemow v. Time Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976); see also authorities cited supra note 2.
4. See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1984)
[hereinafter Miller, The Adversary System] (contrasting traditional view of judges as "presid[ing] from
a neutral distance" with "growing feeling" in favor of active judicial management).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22; cf. Miller, Problems in Administering Relief in
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(bX3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972) [hereinafter Miller, Administer-
ing Relie]; Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 313 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Miller, Giving Notice].
6. See Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and Future, 4 JUST. Sys. J.
197, 198 (1978) (describing initial period of euphoria over class actions; stage of reaction from 1969 to
1973 when courts responded to perceived abuses; and current period of increasing stabilization, justi-
fying optimism) [hereinafter Miller, Federal Class Actions]; see also Miller, Of Frankenstein Mon-
sters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664
(1979) [hereinafter Miller, Class Action Problem]; Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness"
of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299 (1973).
7. See authorities cited supra note 2. Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974) and Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) with Klemow v. Time Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d
12, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) and Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d
1177 (App. Div. 1976).
8. 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) ("[T]o an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment
in a 'class' or 'representative' suit . . . may bind members of the class or those represented who were
not made parties to it.").
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. The expansion and contraction of long-arm jurisdiction over the last four decades itself has
been a subject of intense interest. Such cases as International Shoe, McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) were
typical of early expansion. Later, in sequence, the decisions in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958), Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980), and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), all set
out principles that tended to contract or contain personal jurisdiction. But cf. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985) (sustaining exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state franchisee
with minimum contacts with forum).
11. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316 ("due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, . . . he have certain minimum contacts")
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constitutionally protected property rights 2 that might be adjudicated and
lost in their absence, it seemed that International Shoe might be inter-
preted to require that they, too, either have an affiliation with the forum
or affirmatively opt to be bound by the litigation. s
Similarly, the multistate class action often meant that all fifty states'
laws, along with those of foreign nations, might apply to the various
claims. 4 Some courts, however, chose to apply forum law to all claims,
including those in which the forum had little or no interest.15 Although
the Supreme Court, in cases such as Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,'
had set constitutional limits upon choice of law by requiring an adequate
nexus'" between the litigation and the state whose law was applied,' 8
these limits remained unexplored in the class action context.
These questions arose against a background of class action decisions
concerning other issues of jurisdiction and due process. In Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,'9 for example, the Supreme Court had held that
only the citizenship of named plaintiffs was relevant for determining di-
versity jurisdiction.20 Later, in Snyder v. Harris"' and Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co.,22 the Court disallowed federal jurisdiction over many
class actions by holding that each claimant in a diversity case had to sue
for the jurisdictional amount of more than ten thousand dollars. Then, in
(emphasis added); see also infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982).
13. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
14. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 II1. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914,
cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982); see also infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
15. Compare Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d at 17, 428 N.E.2d at 484 (laws of all fifty states
and foreign countries held applicable to different claims) with Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235
Kan. 195, 221, 679 P.2d 1159, 1181 (1984) (forum's law held applicable uniformly to all claims,
including those having little, if any, connection to forum).
16. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
17. 449 U.S. at 312-13.
18. Cf Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2980 (citing Allstate, 449 U.S. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting)) (em-
phasizing importance of parties' expectations).
19. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
20. The usual requirement of complete diversity otherwise would have made federal diversity
jurisdiction inapplicable to most nationwide classes. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
21. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The amount in controversy requirement is imposed by the diversity
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). See 7A C. WRIGr, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1756 (1986) [hereinafter 7A WRIGHT, MILL.ER & KANE].
22. 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973). In Zahn, unlike Snyder, the named plaintiffs asserted claims
exceeding $10,000, but the class also included claimants who did not assert that amount. The plain-
tiffs argued that ancillary jurisdiction could encompass the lesser claims. The Court disagreed, holding
that all claims must exceed the minimum unless the claims are joint. See Currie, Pendent Parties, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 753, 762-64 (1978); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 400-07 (1976). Ben-Hur and Zahn thus result in a situation in
which diversity generally is determined by reference to the named plaintiffs, but amount in contro-
versy is not. See R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 383-84 (1985).
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Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,23 the Court held that plaintiff representa-
tives in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions must provide individual notice to all
reasonably identifiable members because Rule 23(c)(2), which was drafted
in an effort to comply with due process, 24 explicitly so required. This
requirement must be satisfied, said the Court, even if the cost of notice
would sound the death knell for many meritorious actions.2 5
There also were decisions more directly relevant to multistate class ac-
tions. Some state courts had refused to recognize judgments rendered in
the absence of personal jurisdiction over claimants,26 and defendants thus
were left without assurance that they would be protected by the binding
effects of class decrees. All of these decisions sharpened interest in the
questions of personal jurisdiction and due process raised by multistate
class actions.
28
In 1982, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gillette Co. v.
Miner,29 which presented the question of jurisdiction over multistate class
claimants. Gillette was the prototypical small consumer class action. Each
class member had a potential claim for only a few dollars, and the puta-
tive claimants resided in all fifty states."0 The Illinois courts assumed ju-
risdiction despite constitutional challenge but recognized the need to apply
23. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
24. The pre-1966 class action rule did not create a binding effect in spurious actions. Instead, it
was interpreted to permit "one-way intervention": After a finding of liability, class members could
intervene to file claims. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961),
cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963). Rule reformers, mindful of criticisms concerning the unfairness
of binding defendants but not plaintiffs, extended binding effect to each class action category. To be
fair to class members, however, the reformers determined to require notice to them in Rule 23(b)(3)
class cases, coupled with the right to opt out. This notice appeared to be a condition of due process in
light of the extension of binding effect. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 256; see generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note
21, §§ 1752-1753.
25. The district court had found that mailing notice to all reasonably identifiable class members
would have cost approximately $225,000. Rather than imposing this expense on class counsel, the
court devised a less expensive system of notification, costing approximately $22,000. It included notice
to potentially larger claimants, notice to others selected at random, and newspaper advertisements.
Furthermore, after a mini-hearing in which the court assessed plaintiffs' probable success, it required
defendant to advance 90% of this expense. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 166-68. The Supreme Court disap-
proved of both the method of notice and the shifting of its cost to defendant. Id. at 172-79.
26. E.g., Klemow v. Time Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976);
Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div. 1976).
27. See authorities cited supra note 26. It has been argued that this concern is insubstantial, in
that "it would be the rare class member who would attempt to tread the same ground as the unsuc-
cessful representative plaintiff. . . . [Slecond actions need hardly be feared, for what entrepreneur
would invest time and money in a venture already demonstrated to be profitless?" Dam, Class Action
Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 120. But see infra Section IV(D).
28. See authorities cited supra note 2.
29. 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982). Professor Miller argued Gillette on behalf
of the Gillette Company in the Supreme Court.
30. 87 Ill. 2d at 21-22, 428 N.E.2d at 486 (Ryan, J., dissenting). For a description of the nature
of the action, see infra text accompanying note 231.
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different states' laws to the claims"' and thus faced the possible task of
creating fifty or more categories or subclasses within the class.3 2 After
granting certiorari and hearing oral argument, however, the Supreme
Court dismissed 3 because the Illinois judgment was not final.3"
Then, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court was
presented with another opportunity to address these questions. The courts
of Kansas had exercised jurisdiction over, and applied Kansas substantive
law to, a multistate class action in which the overwhelming majority of
the claims and claimants had no connection with Kansas. 5 The Supreme
Court upheld Kansas' exercise of jurisdiction over class members,3 but it
reversed the application of Kansas law to persons and transactions insuffi-
ciently related to Kansas. 7 Thus, although Shutts makes multistate class
actions more readily available, the opinion also requires that the forum, in
its choice of law, respect the reasonable expectations of the parties.3
The Shutts decision raises important new questions about the propriety
of multistate jurisdiction over defendant classes, equitable claims, and
cases in which burdens are placed on class members. The Court rejected
interstate federalism as a concern underlying personal jurisdiction, at least
in the multistate class action context, but gave it increased importance in
choice of law analysis. The opinion leaves open a number of important
questions about notice and about the binding effect of class decrees. Its
effects on actions in federal courts or cases in which a court has traditional
jurisdiction over class members are as yet undetermined, and its reasoning
threatens the continued viability of so-called mandatory classes. The treat-
ment of choice of law raises possibilities of harmful forum shopping and
may make multistate class actions difficult to manage.
Section I of this Article describes the Shutts case. The Article then con-
siders questions of jurisdiction in multistate class actions in Section II.
Section III discusses the issues raised by mandatory classes and proposes a
four-factor analysis for the certification of classes that involves considera-
31. 87 Ill. 2d at 17, 428 N.E.2d at 483-84.
32. The courts recognized that some states might be classified together because their law might be
similar, and this approach could have reduced the number of discrete categories. 87 Ill. 2d at 18, 428
N.E.2d at 484. But cf. infra Section IV(D)(2).
33. Gillette Co. v. Miner, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
34. The underlying action ultimately was settled.
35. The Kansas court emphasized Kansas' interest in regulating defendant's business activities
within its borders, in protecting the rights of royalty owners (whether they were Kansas residents or
merely "members of this particular class"), and in deciding a case involving law with which it was
familiar, concerning class members who implicitly had "indicated their desire" to have Kansas law
apply, and presenting an alleged "common fund" analogy. 235 Kan. 195, 210-12, 222, 679 P.2d
1159, 1174-75, 1181 (1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
36. 105 S. Ct. at 2972-77.
37. Id. at 2977-81.
38. See generally infra Sections II, IV.
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tions of equity, efficiency, distant forum abuse, and individual control.
Section IV examines the choice of law questions raised by Shutts. It dis-
cusses the issues of "magnet" forums, preference for the forum's own law,
and management difficulties in the fifty-states-plus-foreign-countries class
action. Then, since the Shutts decision increases the need for judges to
become good litigation managers, Section V of the Article considers how
judicial management of such matters as certification, forum determination,
notice, and supervision of counsel may reduce management difficulties. Fi-
nally, Section VI discusses possible national legislation that would im-
prove multistate litigation and class action practice after Shutts.
I. THE SHUTTS DECISION
A. Shutts in the Trial Court: The Class Claims and Their Resolution
Shutts had its origins in Phillips Petroleum Company's suspension of
increases in natural gas royalties to landowners pending final determina-
tion of the lawfulness of the prices upon which the royalty increases were
based. 9 Phillips paid royalties on the increases only to landowners who
agreed to refund any amount adjudged excessive, together with interest at
the rate Phillips would be required to pay in making its own refunds.
40
The courts ultimately upheld the prices in question, and Phillips then
paid the suspended royalties in full.41
Some landowners complained, however, that Phillips' refusal to pay in-
terest on the royalty increases that accrued during the period of suspen-
sion was unlawful.42 Phillips denied that interest was payable. 3 This
seemingly simple dispute was complicated by the wide variety of individ-
ual arrangements that Phillips had entered into with royalty owners and
with other producers.44 Different resolutions of questions of law applica-
39. 105 S. Ct. at 2968-70. The increases were the consequence of contractual provisions triggered
by actions of the Federal Power Commission under its statutory authority to determine "just and
reasonable" price ceilings. The Commission's actions were of uncertain validity. During the 1970s,
the courts reversed administrative increases on many occasions, subjecting gas producers to liabilities
for enormous refunds and accompanying interest. See generally Crump, Natural Gas Price Escala-
tion Clauses: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 70 MINN. L. REv. 61 (1985).
The practice of suspension was a response to difficulties in enforcing collection. No convenient
mechanism was available for a producer who had paid a portion of a later invalidated increase to
royalty owners to collect these funds back. Because owners were dispersed widely and interests often
were transferred, the alternative of collection was impractical.
40. 105 S. Ct. at 2969.
41. Id.
42. There were some other persons pressing complaints in addition to plaintiff Shutts. See infra
note 397 and accompanying text.
43. 105 S. Ct. at 2969.
44. Phillips produced some of the gas and sold it to interstate pipelines. It used some of the gas
itself to manufacture carbon black, or as a feedstock to make other products, or in other transactions
not involving sales to pipelines. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct.
2965 (1985) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. In addition, the Shutts action encompassed some gas
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ble to differently situated potential claimants could have produced results
ranging from no liability to liability at very high interest rates. 5
Shutts and other representative parties brought an action in the district
court of Seward County, Kansas seeking to recover interest from Phillips
on behalf of the entire royalty owner class. 46 Only a small minority of the
class members were Kansas residents, with the rest distributed throughout
all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries.47
Similarly, only a tiny fraction of the affected lands were in Kansas; the
majority were in Oklahoma and Texas, and eleven states were represented
in lease holdings. 4" Thus, most of the controversies that the plaintiffs
asked the Kansas court to adjudicate were unrelated to Kansas.49
The Kansas court certified a nationwide class of approximately
33,00050 claimants over Phillips' jurisdictional objections.51 The class was
reduced by deleting members from whom notice had been returned as un-
deliverable, as well as those who requested exclusion.52 The case then was
tried on behalf of approximately 28,100 class members.53 The trial court
held Phillips liable for interest to the class members, with every claim to
be decided pursuant to Kansas law." The court set interest at the rate
which Phillips itself purchased, rather than produced, but as to which it had contracted with various
producers to dispense royalties to royalty owners to whom those producers became obligated. Id. at 3.
45. See infra notes 67-68. For example, transactions in which Phillips acted merely to dispense
royalties for which other producers had become liable could have been classified so as to preclude
Phillips' liability. See supra note 44.
46. The class was defined to include "all producers and royalty owners to whom Phillips Petro-
leum Company made payment of suspended proceeds of royalties" pursuant to certain specified FPO
orders. Petition, Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 79-C-113 (Dist. Ct. Seward County, Kan.,
May 20, 1983), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 3, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965
(1985) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. An earlier proceeding in Oklahoma had been dismissed volunta-
rily. See infra note 397 and accompanying text.
47. 105 S. Ct. at 2968, 2977 n.6.
48. Id. at 2968-69.
49. Phillips itself was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma.
Id. at 2968.
50. Journal Entry on Class Certification and Notice, Joint Appendix, supra note 46, at 17. The
court made findings on class action requisites, including adequacy of representation, typicality, and
commonality. Id. at 17-18. The approved form of notice was attached to the certification order, as
was a "request for exclusion" that was ordered included with all copies of the notice. Notice of Class
Action Suit, Joint Appendix, supra note 46, at 20-23. A return address was ordered attached to the
envelope in the event of nondeliverability, and an address was provided for return of the request for
exclusion, Id. at 18, 21. Defendant was ordered to provide pressure-sensitive mailing labels addressed
to all class members, and plaintiffs were ordered to cause the notice to be mailed. Id. at 18. For
affidavits of mailing, see id. at 24-27.
51. The Kansas Supreme Court denied Phillips' petition for a writ of mandamus against this
interlocutory order. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Duckworth, No. 82-54608-S (Kan. June 28, 1982)
(mem.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
52. Roughly 1,500 notices were undeliverable and 3,400 class members opted out. 105 S. Ct. at
2969. Plaintiff class members were permitted to opt out pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
223(c)(2). Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. at 206, 679 P.2d at 1170.
53. 105 S. Ct. at 2969.
54. Id. at 2970.
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that the Federal Power Commission made applicable to Phillips, which
Phillips had incorporated into its indemnity agreements. 5
B. The Kansas Supreme Court's Decision
Phillips argued in the Kansas Supreme Court that the trial court's ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs was unconstitutional. The
Kansas court, however, affirmed the judgment.5" The court concluded that
Kansas had a "legitimate interest" in adjudicating claims of nonresident
class members because Phillips did business57 and owned property in
Kansas.58 Further, the court asserted that the case was analogous to
United States Supreme Court decisions5" upholding jurisdiction over
claims against a "common fund." 0 These cases allowed jurisdiction to be
based upon an identifiable account in the forum in which claimants had
potentially conflicting rights.61 Most importantly, the Kansas court distin-
guished International Shoe on the ground that class plaintiffs, unlike de-
fendants, were protected adequately by notice and representation.
62
The Kansas court also rejected Phillips' objection to the application of
55. Id. at 2969. These FPC rates were applicable by regulation to any refunds that Phillips
might be required to make as a result of price increases that later were invalidated. See supra note 39.
The use of this high interest rate, which was applicable to an unrelated transaction, was thus a key
feature of the court's decision. There was, however, no indication of any agreement to such a rate
between Phillips and its royalty owners, nor was there any evidence that applicable state law would
impute it, except in Kansas. Accordingly, this conclusion gave rise to one of Phillips' most vigorous
complaints. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 32.
56. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2965
(1985). The court drew heavily upon an earlier, unrelated class action between the same nominal
parties, styled Shutts, Executor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978) [hereinafter "Shutts I"]. The principal opinion discussed in this Article,
which was reviewed by the Supreme Court, is referred to as "Shutts II."
57. 235 Kan. at 210-12, 679 P.2d at 1174. This interest was enhanced, said the court, because
the suit involved the oil and gas industry, an industry that was "significant" in Kansas. 235 Kan. at
212, 679 P.2d at 1174.
58. 235 Kan. at 211, 679 P.2d at 1174.
59. The principal decision of this type was Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 670-71
(1915), in which the Court concluded that an insurer's safety fund, consisting of policyholders' contri-
butions, was necessarily treated as a unit because "[tihe Fund was single .... It would have been
destructive of [the policyholders'] mutual rights ... to use the Mortuary Fund in one way ... in
one State and to use it in another way . . . in a different State." In Ibs, this reasoning provided a
justification for both jurisdiction over a multistate class and application of uniform law.
In Shutts, however, there would have been no inconsistency if one claimant recovered one amount
from Phillips and another received whatever other amount, if any, might be due him, or if the Texas
royalty holders' claims were adjudicated in Texas under Texas law, with Texas interest rates
applicable.
60. 235 Kan. at 201, 211-12, 679 P.2d at 1168, 1174.
61. This reasoning was subject to the criticism that none of the criteria for a common fund was
met. Phillips described the Kansas Court's reasoning as "sheer alchemy." Petition for Certiorari at 18,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). The Supreme Court said that there was "no
'common fund' located in Kansas. . . [T]he term becomes all but meaningless when used in such an
expansive sense." 105 S. Ct. at 2979.
62. Id. at 206-07, 679 P.2d at 1171.
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Kansas law to transactions unrelated to Kansas. It reasoned that forum
law should control unless "compelling reasons" required the application
of another state's law.63 It buttressed this conclusion with the same com-
mon fund analogy" 4 that it had used to uphold jurisdiction. The court also
noted that "[t]he plaintiff class members have indicated their desire to
have this action determined under the laws of Kansas.""5 Thus, the choice
of Kansas law did not depend upon any contacts between the forum and
the claims,66 and it resulted in a judgment for all class members6 7 at the
highest arguable interest rates.6 8
C. Shutts in the United States Supreme Court
1. Jurisdiction over Multistate Claimants
The United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld Kansas' exer-
cise of jurisdiction. 9 The purpose of the International Shoe test, said
Justice Rehnquist for the Court, was to protect an unaffiliated defendant
"from the travail of defending in a distant forum."'70 Although the Court
recognized that class plaintiffs were in danger of losing the property inter-
63. Id. at 221-22, 679 P.2d at 1181.
64. Id. at 201, 211-12, 679 P.2d at 1168, 1174; see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
65. 235 Kan. at 222, 679 P.2d at 1181.
66. Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court noted with apparent approval that the trial court had
neither considered whether any differences existed between Kansas law and the laws of other states
nor examined whether other states' law should be applicable. Id. at 221, 679 P.2d at 1180-81.
67. Texas courts, for example, had recognized no rate greater than 6%. See Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. 1978) (imputed interest at 6%); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 365 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 11
(providing 6% rate); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (same). At
least one court had held that, under Texas law, the absolute tender of royalties conditioned on indem-
nity (as Phillips arguably had done) excused any interest liability. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. River-
view Gas Compression Co., 409 F. Supp. 486, 495-96 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
Oklahoma constitutional and statutory provisions set a 6% interest rate. OKLA. CONST. art. XIV, §
2; OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 266 (West Supp. 1985); see also West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v.
Young, 325 P.2d 1047 (Okla. 1958); Smith v. Robinson, 594 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1979); Rendezvous
Trails of America, Inc. v. Ayers, 612 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). An Oklahoma statute
excused interest if a creditor accepted payment of full principal without a claim for interest. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 8 (West 1955); ef. Webster Drilling Co. v. Sterling Oil of Okla., 376 P.2d 236
(Okla. 1962).
Furthermore, the law thus applied by Kansas also differed from that of Louisiana, which had a 7%
rate at the time of suit. See Wurzlow v. Placid Oil Co., 279 So. 2d 749, 772-74 (La. Ct. App. 1973)
(applying statute to oil and gas royalties); LA. CiV. ConE ANN. art. 1938 (West 1977). Louisiana had
approximately ten times as many affected leases as Kansas and more than a thousand times as much
in suspended royalties. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2977 n.6.
68. The rates set by the Kansas courts for all claims were 7% for royalties retained until October
1974, 9% for royalties retained between that date and September 1979, and the average prime rate
thereafter. 105 S. Ct. at 2970. The differences attributable to applicable rates alone "certainly
amounted to millions of dollars in liability." Id. at 2978. This greater rate primarily was attributable
to Kansas' replacement of Texas and Oklahoma law with FPC interest rates, used for another pur-
pose in unrelated transactions. See supra note 55.
69. 105 S. Ct. at 2977.
70. Id. at 2973.
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ests represented by their claims,71 it reasoned that they were unlikely to be
subjected to judgments against them, *7 or to other significant burdens such
as discovery,73 costs, 74 or attorneys' fees. 5
Finally, the Court discussed the equity protections traditionally ac-
corded class members. Certain of these protections were required as a
matter of procedural due process in the multistate class action: (1) the
nonresident plaintiff must "receive notice"; 76 (2) he must be provided the
"opportunity to be heard and participate";7 7 (3) the notice must be "the
best practicable, 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,'" to
serve its constitutional purposes;78 (4) the notice should "describe the ac-
tion and the plaintiffs' rights in it";7 9 (5) the absent plaintiff must be
provided with an "opt-out" form by which he may make a "request for
71. Id. The Court thus accepted Phillips' contention that a "chose in action is a constitutionally
recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs." Id.; see also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S.
541 (1948) (claim protected from effort to extinguish it in court without personal jurisdiction); cf.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America at 13, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985) ("nonresident class members are actually in a position analogous to that of
defendants in that they may lose their rights involuntarily").
72. 105 S. Ct. at 2973.
73. Id. at 2974; cf. infra Section II(C)(2) (discussing the propriety of burdens on class members).
74. 105 S. Ct. at 2974.
75. The Court contrasted class members' freedom from these typical defense burdens with the
benefits to plaintiffs of participating in an economically viable means of recovering small claims. 105
S. Ct. at 2974.
The Kansas court had been especially concerned about these issues. After pointing out that Eisen,
Zahn, and Snyder precluded federal jurisdiction, and that the FPC also lacked jurisdiction over the
issue, the Shutts I court asked, "[ijf the state courts will not hear the matter, who will grant relief?"
Shutts I, 222 Kan. at 545, 567 P.2d at 1306 (1977). The court continued: "If state courts cannot
maintain class action suits, can the 'small man' find legal redress in our modern society which increas-
ingly exposes people to group injuries . . .?" Id. at 545, 567 P.2d at 1307 (citing Homburger, State
Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLuM. L. REV. 609, 641-43 (1971)). The Shutts II court
cited this prior reasoning with approval, and it charged that Phillips was arguing for actions in sev-
eral different state courts and thus was using "'divide and conquer' as a strategy to avoid liability to
individual royalty owners." 235 Kan. at 204, 679 P.2d at 1169.
76. 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
77. This right must be available, said the Court, whether it is asserted in person or through
counsel. Id.
The elevation of this right of participation or intervention to due process status is new. Cf Woolen
v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 684 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1982) (relegating intervention in class action to
status governed by Federal Rule 24(a)); 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1799 (1986) [hereinafter 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE] ("Inter-
vention in class actions is governed by the same principles as apply in any other proceeding."). It
seems that the right to opt out and to bring one's own action separately (a right that the Court also
established in Shutts HI) would protect interests of the claimant. Conversely, numerous interventions
may diminish the efficiency of the class action (or even enable obnoxious small claimants to make
extortionate demands on other parties by threatening costly delay). Whether the Court's unconditional
statement of the right of participation reflects its true thinking remains to be seen.
78. 105 S. Ct. at 2975 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314-15 (1950)); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1974). "Best practi-
cal" notice, notice "reasonably calculated" to apprise the claimant, "deliverable" notice, and notice
actually "received" are all subtly different formulations to be found within the opinion. See infra
Section II(B).
79. 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
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exclusion";80 and (6) nominal parties must "adequately represent the in-
terests of the absent class members." '
In adopting these protections, the Court held that due process did not
require nonresident claimants to "opt in" to the class."2 Since plaintiffs
may consent to jurisdiction in any forum,' the Court concluded that si-
lence after notice was adequate evidence of that consent.8 4 Small claims of
individuals unfamiliar with the law would be lost through an opt-in re-
quirement, said the Court; however, sophisticated claimants would receive
sufficient protection from the right to opt out. 5 The Court was unwilling
to sacrifice the efficiency of opt-out class actions for the "somewhat rare"
claimant whose silence might not indicate consent.8"
2. Choice of Law
A seven-member majority of the Court began its discussion of the choice
of law issue87 by pointing out that ninety-nine percent of the gas leases
and approximately ninety-seven percent of the plaintiffs had no apparent
connection to Kansas.' It then considered whether Kansas law conflicted
with the laws of states having more significant interests in the claims."9
An examination of Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana law convinced the
Court that differences in applicable laws were not "false conflicts" and
could affect "millions of dollars in liability."90
The Court based its analysis of these conflicts principally upon Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague."1 In that case, the decedent had resided, ob-
tained insurance, and been killed in Wisconsin, although he had worked
in Minnesota and his widow had moved to Minnesota after his death for
80. Id.
81. Id. This requirement is among those imposed by federal rule 23, but Shutts thus made it a
condition of due process in any state.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-81 (1984) (plaintiff could
bring suit in New Hampshire despite her own lack of contact with that state).
84. 105 S. Ct. at 2976.
85. Id. The Court did not deal with the possibility that a sophisticated class member desiring to
file her own action on a substantial claim might not receive the notice or might have it mislaid by
personnel who do not appreciate its significance. See infra Section II(A)(2).
86. 105 S. Ct. at 2976. But see supra note 85.
87. Justice Stevens dissented from this holding and Justice Powell did not participate in the deci-
sion. 105 S. Ct. at 2981.
88. 105 S. Ct. 2977. The dollar amount of suspended royalties provides an even better indication
of Kansas' tenuous interest in the action. Kansas leases represented less than $3,000, out of a total of
more than $10 million. The Court set out state-by-state information in a chart. Id. at 2977 n.6.
89. Id. at 2977-78.
90. Id. at 2978; see supra notes 67-68.
91. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The Shutts Court also relied upon the discussions of choice of law in
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939), John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936), and Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408
(1930). Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2979-81.
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reasons unrelated to the litigation. The Minnesota courts had applied
Minnesota law allowing plaintiffs to recover under multiple uninsured
motorist policies, rather than Wisconsin law disallowing such "stack-
ing."'92 The Supreme Court held that the selection of applicable law must
be based upon "a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that [the] choice . . . is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair."9 Using this test, the Allstate plurality found
Minnesota's contacts with the litigation sufficient to support that state's
application of its own law."
In Shutts, however, the absence of contacts tying most of the claims to
Kansas led to the opposite result. The Court flatly rejected Kansas' com-
mon fund reasoning. 5 Likewise, the Court gave "little credence" to the
argument that the class plaintiffs had evidenced their desire to be bound
by Kansas law. 98 Because that approach would make "the invitation to
forum shopping . . . irresistable,"97 the Court concluded that "plaintiffs'
desire for forum law is rarely, if ever, controlling."9' 8
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that a forum had greater lati-
tude in applying its own law merely because it was adjudicating a multi-
state class action.9 9 Constitutional requirements could not be avoided
merely because it was more burdensome 00 to adjudicate a large number
of unaffiliated transactions."' The Court considered the "expectation of
the parties" to be an important element in this calculus. 02 Although the
Court made no effort to determine which states' laws should have been
applied, it did proscribe the application of Kansas law to every claim as
"sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits.' 0 3
92. 449 U.S. at 306.
93. Id. at 312-13.
94. Id. There has been substantial controversy over this result, with the Allstate dissenters and
numerous commentators arguing that Minnesota's contacts were insufficient to justify application of
its law. See infra note 408.
95. 105 S. Ct. at 2979; see also supra notes 59-60. The Court found that there was neither a
specific identifiable res in Kansas nor a limited amount that might be depleted.
96. 105 S. Ct. at 2979.
97. Id. at 2979 (quoting Allstate, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
98. 105 S. Ct. at 2979.
99. Id. at 2980.
100. Thus the Court criticized as "bootstrapping" the argument of the Kansas court that applica-
tion of Kansas law was satisfied by the class certification requirement of common questions of law or
fact. Id. A question of fact common to the class could arise in a state other than Kansas, and although
that commonality would help to satisfy one of the certification requirements, it would furnish no
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3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens dissented from the choice of law holding."', He con-
cluded that there was "no 'direct' or 'substantive' conflict between the law
applied by Kansas and the laws of. . .other States." 10 5 In his view, Kan-
sas had merely "developed general ...principles to accommodate the
novel facts of this litigation-other state courts either agree with Kansas
or have not yet addressed precisely similar claims."' '
To Justice Stevens, the other seven Justices' definition of conflicts was
excessively "loose." 101 He rejected the finding of a conflict based upon a
conclusion that Texas or Oklahoma would "most likely"108 decide the is-
sue differently.109 Instead, Justice Stevens searched for constructions of
those states' laws that could be considered consistent with Kansas' hold-
ing. 10 As a result, he saw the litigation as "a classic 'false conflicts'
case." ' 1 In Justice Stevens' view, a choice of law decision could present
no constitutional question unless it involved an "unambiguous conflict
with the established law of another State.
112
104. Id. at 2981.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2982.
108. Id. at 2989.
109. Justice Stevens argued that mere error or novelty in the Kansas court's construction of sister
states' laws should not influence the outcome. Otherwise, he maintained, Supreme Court jurisdiction
would be invoked whenever a state court arguably misconstrued another state's statute. Id. at 2992.
Although the majority shared this principle, see id. at 2980, its conclusion differed from that of Jus-
tice Stevens primarily because the majority did not view the Kansas decision as reflecting a mere error
in choosing or determining the substantive law. In a situation in which Kansas had had no prelitiga-
tion contacts with most of the disputes in the action, Kansas had declined to consider the law likely to
be applied in any other state. The majority's reasoning thus would recognize a difference between a
tribunal, on the one hand, that conscientiously attempts to determine other states' law but does so in a
less than perfect manner, and a tribunal, on the other hand, that refuses the attempt. Id. at 2978.
110. Justice Stevens defended Kansas' authority to reject as inapplicable all statutes urged by
Phillips as controlling and to base its decision, instead, on general principles of equity. Id. at 2990-91.
The difficulty, however, was that Kansas had made no effort to determine the likelihood that these
general principles of equity would have been followed by Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana.
Justice Stevens also defended Kansas' authority to decide the case under common fund analysis, id.
at 2984 n.5, 2986, contrary to the majority's conclusion that no justification could be found for this
reasoning and that it would reduce the term to "meaninglessness." See supra note 95 and accompany-
ing text.
111. 105 S. Ct. at 2989. Professor Kennedy argues that Justice Stevens "reveals his true concern"
as "protect[ing] the Supreme Court from plodding through the dismal swamp of conflict of laws at the
call of every losing lawyer." Kennedy, supra note 1, at 277. Ironically, Justice Stevens' approach
required him to "wade through the quicksand of Oklahoma and Texas oil and gas law in order to
prove the 'false conflict.'" Id.
112. 105 S. Ct. at 2990 (emphasis in original).
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II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER SHUTTS
A. Implied Consent as the Basis of Power To Adjudicate
1. Inference of Consent from Silence
An unbroken series of decisions before Shutts, stretching back beyond
International Shoe, 18 requires a substantial relationship between a state
and any individual over whom its courts seek to assert jurisdiction." 4
Many formulations of the relevant test refer expressly to defendants.
However, the affiliation requirement obviously is intended to protect all
interests that might be affected by an assertion of state judicial power.
Thus, in Shaffer v. Heitner,"' in which the forum purported to base jur-
isdiction upon power over property rather than power over persons, the
Court stated: "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jur-
isdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny."11 "
In Shutts, the Court did not remove this protection from class plaintiffs.
Its reasoning, instead, was based upon the inference of consent from class
members' failure to opt out.1 ' 7 In the absence of appropriate evidence of a
plaintiff's consent, the International Shoe reasoning presumably would
prevent adjudication of that plaintiff's interests.1 8 Shutts poses the ques-
tion whether the general proposition that jurisdiction may be based on
consent1.9 should be extended to situations in which a nonaffiliated person
silently fails to opt out.
The rights of nonresident class members can be appreciated by consid-
ering either a class action in which defendant prevails and claimants take
nothing.2 or an action that is settled for much less than some class mem-
113. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
114. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("every State possesses exclusive juris-
diction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory") (emphasis added).
115. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
116. Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
117. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. See generally Kennedy, supra note 1, at
270-71 (analyzing consent theory advanced in Shutts).
118. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's express reservation of cases in which plaintiffs
are subject to counterclaims or other litigation burdens. See infra Section II(C)(2).
119. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (defendant's consent to appoint-
ment of agent for receipt of process evidenced by act of operating motor vehicle on public way within
commonwealth).
120. For example, during the pendency of similar class claims elsewhere, at least two suits by
school districts for damages pertaining to asbestos installation resulted in defendants' verdicts. See S.C.
School District Loses Asbestos Damage Suit, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 2, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
Likewise, a suit brought by hundreds of plaintiffs claiming injury from the drug Bendectin termi-
nated in a verdict for defendants, after the failure of efforts to certify certain classes pertaining to the
claims. See Ohio Judge Upholds Defense Verdict in Bendectin Cases, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 30, 1985, at
49, col. 1. The case is now on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. In re Bendectin Litig., J.P.M.D.L. No.
486 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 1985), appeal docketed, No. 35-3858 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1985).
Vol. 96: 1, 1986
Multistate Class Actions After Shutts
bers think is reasonable. These possibilities suggest that the power to ad-
judicate depends upon nonresidents' having voluntarily and intelligently
submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction for better or for worse.
However, a court lacking power to compel appearance arguably has no
authority to compel a putative class member to opt in or to opt out.121
Absence of power to compel appearance logically is inconsistent with
power to compel a binding choice through the compulsory filing of a pa-
per with the court. Furthermore, class notices are not comparable in effec-
tiveness to service of process. They are notoriously poorly understood, and
lay recipients may be tempted to throw them away because they give the
false impression that legal effects can be avoided by inaction. 22
In Shutts, the Supreme Court considered these arguments and held that
the benefits of opt-out class actions overcame them.1 23 However, the devel-
opment of these concerns shows how heavily the Court's opinion is depen-
dent upon class members' receipt and clear understanding of the notice
and opt-out form. The notice-related concerns, which are discussed later
in this Article, 24 are more important because of the Court's reliance on
consent as the basis of jurisdiction.
In fact, as Professor Kennedy demonstrates, the Court's consent reason-
ing is theoretically flawed, even though it may reach a desirable result.
1 25
Justice Rehnquist labels class members from the outset as "plaintiffs," but
the better approach is to regard them as sui generis 1 2' Rule 23 avoids
characterizing them as either plaintiffs or defendants. Persons who opted
out may have been Phillips employees, or altruistic idealists who agreed
with Phillips on the merits, or conscientious objectors to litigation, or large
claimants who intended to file their own actions-and there is no way to
determine how many of those who did not opt out may have fallen into
these categories as well.1 27 Thus, the class members' implied consent is at
least in some measure fictitious. It transforms the class members into
"super plaintiffs": persons who have the benefits of plaintiff status but
121. See Fisch, Notice, Costs, and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri's New Common-Question
Class Action, 38 Mo. L. REv. 173, 212 (1973); Note, PersonalJurisdiction and Multistate Plaintiff
Class Actions: The Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 441,
459 n.133 (1983).
122. See Miller, Giving Notice, supra note 5, at 321-22; see also Kennedy, supra note 2, at
42-44 (emphasizing need to explain procedural rights of notice to recipients).
Furthermore, every class action necessarily imposes limits on the time and manner of opting out.
See infra Section 1I(B); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) (recognizing court's authority to set time
limits).
123. See supra note 75.
124. See infra Section II(B).
125. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 278-84, 290-97.
126. Id. at 280.
127. Id. at 290-91.
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few of the disabilities.1 18 Furthermore, as has been pointed out, this rea-
soning subtly expands the nature of judicial power itself; the judge be-
comes a quasi-administrative officer dealing with the rights of passive
"plaintiffs."' 29 At the same time, the fictitious nature of the consent ra-
tionale makes it difficult to predict its application in future cases.
2. Inadvertent Loss of Claims Through Inaction
The Shutts Court's consent reasoning raises the prospect of a more sub-
stantial issue. It is based on a vision of a plaintiff with a small claim that
would not be adjudicated but for the inference of consent through silence.
Its holding, however, also may affect the rights of a large claimant. A
class member with a large claim may fail to opt out, and thus may evi-
dence consent, because she has misplaced a class notice or failed to receive
it. If the class member then fails to file a claim at the damage or settle-
ment stage because of lack of actual notice, her nonresponsiveness not only
signals consent but forecloses her from sharing in the award. 3
To evaluate these concerns, one may 'imagine a hypothetical entity
called the Small Stakes Royalty Company, which receives an opt-out no-
tice (or a damage claim form) written in legal jargon. The notice is re-
ceived by accounting personnel, because that department is the place
where the class defendant usually mails royalty checks. The notice wends
its way up the corporate hierarchy through different personnel who con-
sider what to do about it; ultimately, it is lost or inadvertently thrown
away. Another possibility is that an opt-out cutoff date imposed by the
court passes in the interim, and although Small Stakes files the form and
believes it has opted out, it instead has been included in the class. Unless
Small Stakes makes proof of its damages before the cutoff date imposed by
the court, it may lose all entitlement to relief. 31
Not all class actions involve average claims of a few dollars, as in Gil-
lette, or of a hundred dollars, as in Shutts. In the federal context, an anti-
trust claim, a claim arising from a mass tort, a securities class claim, or an
asbestos removal claim, may be sufficiently large to support individual
litigation quite comfortably.' 2 Should a substantial claim be lost because
128. Id. at 282-83.
129. Id. at 284.
130. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 228 (1985); see also infra Section II(B)(1).
131. In one antitrust class action, the potential recovery fund was $2 million, but payable claims
after trebling totalled only $17,482. Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019,
1024, 1032 (5th Cir. 1983). The occurrence of shortfalls of this size indicates that the Small Stakes
scenarios hypothesized in the text are significant possibilities.
132. Although some of these examples concern federal claims, they probably would involve multi-
state classes, and would implicate issues analogous to those in state courts hearing multistate class
actions. See infra Section II(D)(1).
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a lay employee has not initiated appropriate action in response to a
printed sheet concerning a case in which his employer does not appear to
be involved?
The Shutts Court resolved this problem by balancing interests.133 If the
class claims are uniformly small, the problem disappears,"', but in cases
with both large and small claims, or with generally large claims, it could




1. The Requirement that Notice Be "Received"
In its formulation of due process requirements, the Court states that
each claimant in a multistate class action "must receive notice. '"6 A re-
quirement of actual receipt of notice would be a major departure from
past requirements. Federal Rule 23(c)(2) has been interpreted to require
individual notice only in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, and then only to members
"who can be identified through reasonable effort."113 7 Insistence on actual
receipt would go beyond due process requirements for defendants, who
can have judgment rendered against them upon notice "reasonably calcu-
lated" to reach them, even if it never is received. 3 8 Perhaps the Shutts
Court considered that more stringent notice requirements were justified
when jurisdiction was dependent upon the implication of consent by
claimants.3 9 The opt-out right and the inference of consent are meaning-
less without actual notice.
However, the requirement that notice be "received" is followed, in the
Court's opinion, by a statement that the notice must be "reasonably calcu-
lated" to reach the claimant 40 and by citation to the Mullane and Eisen
cases, which do not require actual receipt. 41 Furthermore, the Court im-
plicitly approves the method of notice actually used in Shutts.Y42 The class
133. The Court's opinion deals carefully with notice of the class action, but issues surrounding
notice at the claim stage, or nonreceipt of notice, were not presented in Shutts.
134. In the case of small claims, individual litigation is impractical. Notice costs greater than the
amount of probable claims less attorney's fees thus would be inappropriate.
135. See infra Section V(D).
136. 105 S. Ct. at 2975 (emphasis added).
137. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-77 (1974).
138. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) ("notice reasona-
bly certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all"); cf.
Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1914) (judgment upheld against due process attack,
even though return was made falsely, and defendant in fact was not served and had no knowledge of
proceeding).
139. See supra Section II(A)(I).
140. 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
141. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
142. 105 S. Ct. at 2969, 2975.
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representatives provided each member with notice by first-class mail, and
the district court excluded potential class members whose notices were re-
turned as undeliverable.143 If actual receipt is the requirement, this
method may provide circumstantial evidence of its satisfaction. Direct
proof of receipt could be obtained only by certified mail restricted to the
addressee."" This method would so increase costs that it should not be
inferred as a general requirement without an express statement of the
Court. Thus the most appropriate reading of Shutts may be that class
members constitutionally may be included if first-class mail is directed to
them and is not returned as undeliverable. 45
Although Shutts may not require receipt of notice, it may invalidate
state rules relaxing notice requirements. In the wake of Eisen, some states
sought to enhance the efficiency of class actions by allowing partial mail-
ing, advertising, notice to class members suffering large damages, and no-
tice as prescribed by the court, as substitutes for individual first-class
mail 4" which Eisen had held was required under the Federal Rules.
147
Indeed, a special committee of the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association has recommended elimination of the individual notice require-
ment of Rule 23(c)(2) in favor of a discretionary notice provision. 4' At
least in the multistate context, Shutts appears to invalidate these provi-
sions. The Eisen requirement of the best practical notice to individual
claimants, which is based directly on Rule 23 and only indirectly on due
process, is expanded by Shutts into a more general due process
requirement.
Yet another issue is presented by the possibility that, in a subsequent
suit, a person might be bound upon "delivery" that does not amount to
"receipt." The simplest example is that of the individual who has moved
from the residence to which the notice is addressed. 49 In that event, the
143. Id.
144. When service by mail is authorized, rules of court generally require certified, restricted mail.
Cf TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 106 (Vernon 1979).
145. Ironically, even a requirement that nondelivery result in exclusion (if that is what Shutts
means) would go beyond the requirements of Eisen, a case often thought to impose notice require-
ments so stringent as to sound the death knell for many class actions. See supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
146. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2023(C) (West Supp. 1985) (providing alternatives to
individual notice, including publication and posting, when class numbers more than 500 members).
147. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 217.
149. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456
U.S. 444 (1982); Sterling v. Environmental Control Bd., 793 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986); cf. Covey v.
Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (mailed notice, although ordinarily sufficient, did not satisfy
due process in the case of individual known to be insane and committed to hospital). In Greene, the
majority held that notice posted in forcible entry and detainer cases on the doors of tenants' residences,
which tenants claimed not to have received, was constitutionally inadequate unless supplemented by
mailed notice. The dissenters argued: "It is no secret, after all, that unattended mailboxes are subject
to plunder by thieves." 456 U.S. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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notice might well be "delivered," but the potential claimant would not
"receive" it. Another possibility, already discussed, is that of notice di-
rected to a division of a large organization, in which nonlawyer employees
may treat it as junk mail. 150
The solution to this problem may be to allow exceptions to the binding
effect of a class action.151 However, the defendant's interest in finality,
recognized in Shutts, correspondingly would be undermined. If the
amounts at issue are small, as they would be in consumer class actions,
the problem may be insignificant. However, the Shutts opinion applies to
cases in which some class members may have substantial damages, and in
that event, instances of delivery-but-nonreceipt may cause very real
problems.
For example, in one recent case, Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v. Ber-
ger & Montague, P.C.,152 a class member failed to receive notice of the
need to prove its damages and was precluded after settlement from recov-
ery of a sum approximating $250,000 by a court-imposed cutoff date.
Having failed to opt out of the class, it was bound by the judgment. It
sued the class attorneys, on the novel theory that the use of mere first-
class mail, rather than a means that would ensure receipt, such as certi-
fied mail, constituted legal malpractice. The class member supported the
argument by showing that the response rate of claims was only twelve
percent, even though the settlement was for $20,000,000. 'S The class was
relatively small, so that certified mail would have been inexpensive, and
each member's settlement share was large.'"
The court in Zimmer Paper Products denied recovery on the ground
that the attorneys had followed standard practice.' 5 Nevertheless, the case
clearly illustrates the need for distinguishing among requirements for the
"sending" of notice, the "delivery" of first-class mail, and the actual "re-
ceipt" of notice by the claimants. Each of these formulations can be justi-
fied by reference to the reasoning in Shutts,'58 and the yardstick that is
chosen could make quite a difference.
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court's downplaying in Shutts of
the arguments for opt-out requirements may be persuasive, the Zimmer
Paper Products case shows that notice to class members at the damage
150. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
151. See infra Section 11(F).
152. 758 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 228 (1985).
153. Id. at 92.
154. The class consisted of approximately 1550 members. Thus the average payout, not consider-
ing deductions for attorneys' fees and expenses, would have been approximately $12,000. Id.
155. Id. at 91-92.
156. Shutts says that a class plaintiff "must receive" notice, 105 S. Ct. at 2975, but it also de-
scribes with apparent approval the method used by the Kansas trial court, which emphasized deliver-
ability, id. at 2969-70, and cites cases that require only the sending of mailed notice. Id. at 2975.
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phase sometimes presents a serious issue. Inaction at the initial notice
stage can be treated as consent, but the inaction of a huge, passive class at
the damage stage has the effect of cutting off recoveries, because proof of
loss cannot be inferred as easily as can consent. The existence of class
actions in which settlement funds remain largely unclaimed indicates that
the problem is real, 157 even though the Shutts situation did not present it.
2. Incomprehensible Notice and Nonresponsive Responses
The Court's inference of consent in Shutts depended upon the assump-
tion that notice would communicate effectively to claimants their rights
and options.' 58 Much of what lawyers write, however, including many
class action notices, is incomprehensible to average citizens. The lawyerly
concern for completeness and accuracy may conflict with the objective of
intelligibility." 9
The tetracycline cases provide a good illustration. 60 The Attorney
General of North Carolina sent notice of these actions to a broad spec-
trum of people.' 6 ' The responses he received provide amusing evidence of
the difficulty of communicating legal matters to lay people."6 2 They also
offer clear evidence that attempts to secure and distribute relief will be
frustrated without comprehensive notice.
In Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co.,'"3 standard-form legal notices
were held unconstitutional because they were written in such a way that a
non-lawyer could not understand his or her rights with respect to appear-
ance, venue, or other procedures. The application of such decisions as
Aguchak to class action notices has been suggested."" However, since the
157. See supra note 131.
158. See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
159. For example, technically accurate statements of processes controlled by the federal rules
would require either use of legal terminology unfamiliar to nonlawyers or complex explanation. Com-
plete portrayal of future possibilities would require careful hedging. See infra note 166. A better
solution may be to limit the description to simple explanations and reasonable probabilities.
160. See Miller, Giving Notice, supra note 5, at 321-22.
161. Id. at 321.
162. The responses included the following:
Dear Mr. Clerk: I have your notice that I owe you $300 for selling drugs. I have never sold
any drugs, especially those you have listed; but I have sold a little whiskey once in a while.
Dear Sir: I received this paper from you. I guess I really don't understand it, but if I have
been given one of those drugs, nobody told me why. If it means what I think it does, I have not
been with a man in nine years.
Dear Sir: I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great value to me in
the future. I am unable to attend your class, however.
Dear Mr. Attorney General: I am sorry to say this, but you have the wrong John Doe,
because in 1954, 1 wasn't but three years old and didn't even have a name. Mother named me
when I got my driver's license. Up to then, they just called me Baby Doe.
Id. at 322.
163. 520 P.2d 1352, 1356-58 (Alaska 1974).
164. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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concern for completeness and accuracy may conflict with the value of com-
prehension, a short notice written in clear English, even though failing to
set forth the recipient's rights in the utmost detail, should be preferred.
The Court's opinion in Shutts, which highlights only a few aspects of the
notice, 65 is consistent with this conclusion. 68
The North Carolina tetracycline case responses 167 also illustrate an-
other problem: What is to be done if a putative class member answers
ambiguously? Although a categorical rule treating any variation from the
opt-out form as a consent might produce undesirable results, it may be
needed to prevent strategic behavior by claimants. A class member other-
wise might attempt to "ride the verdict" by writing a letter attaching con-
ditions to her inclusion and hoping to place herself in a position in which
she may participate in the class award if the action terminates in a large
settlement, but pursue her own action if it does not. A categorical rule also
is needed for efficient administration. For example, a court could expend
considerable effort guessing whether the tetracycline class responses re-
ferred to above were elections to opt out; thus, a rule simply including
these individuals seems fair as well as administratively convenient.
C. Other Issues of Adjudicatory Power in Particular Actions
1. Multiple Competing Nationwide Class Actions
The possibility that courts in two or more states might certify different
actions covering the same nationwide class raises a separate issue of adju-
165. The Court quoted the test set forth in Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, that the notice must be
"reasonably calculated. . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections." Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975. It also stated that the notice
should "describe the action and the plaintiffs' rights in it." Id.
166. A separate but potentially significant problem is that of redefining the class or the claims
after initial certification. Shutts requires, as one of the due process requirements, that the notice
"describe the action and the plaintiffs' rights in it." 105 S. Ct. at 2975. A class action, however, is a
fluid thing, as are the rights of claimants. A certification order is conditional and "may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Csv. P. 23(c)(1). The pleadings also may be
amended, and the lawsuit's complexion may change in ways that are unforeseeable at the time of
notice.
The resulting difficulties may be appreciated by considering a nonresident notice recipient who
relies upon class certification and therefore refrains from filing her own action. Subsequently, the class
is redefined to exclude that class member. The resulting delay in bringing her own action may
prejudice her chances.
The Shutts opinion implicitly treats this problem of unanticipated adverse change by balancing
costs and benefits to class members. 105 S. Ct. at 2976. The Court divides the universe into small
claimants, whose unresponsiveness indicates the economic advantages of inclusion, and large sophisti-
cated claimants. Perhaps it is reasonable to impose the risk of unanticipated adverse change upon
plaintiffs in either category, since the sophisticated class member must anticipate some risk in a law-
suit and the small claimant could not recover absent class relief anyway. Id. The Court's requirement
that the notice set forth "the plaintiffs' rights" must be viewed in light of the reality that a lawsuit has
an uncertain future. In particular, the prediction of future contingencies, although it marginally might
help sophisticated class members, inappropriately complicates communication to consumers.
167. See supra note 162.
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dicatory power. Both actions would proceed with a passive class virtually
intact in each. Professor Kennedy describes the problem best:"68
Among the hypothetical parade of horribles which can be projected
is the scenario in which 50 competing, national, multistate opt-out
class actions are brought on the same claims and all members remain
silent in response to the fifty notices. . . . [T]his dilemma of inter-
state federalism perhaps can only be solved by the United States Su-
preme Court constitutionally requiring pre-trial opt-in as to nonresi-
dent class members who have no minimum contacts with the forum.
In Shutts, however, the Supreme Court declined to adopt this solution,'69
and the issue of adjudicatory power in competing class actions remains
open.
Presumably, competing class actions could be resolved only by a race to
judgment if no national means for selecting among different courts is de-
veloped.170 Race to judgment would induce several undesirable kinds of
behavior. For example, defendants could forum-shop by delaying or accel-
erating particular actions.17 1  Plaintiffs could collude with similarly
aligned parties in "stalking horse litigation," diverting their opponents'
attention or seeking collateral advantages such as the cumulative benefits
of inconsistent discovery rulings. Whatever form it takes, a race is an irra-
tional method of adjudicating controversies of overlapping jurisdiction.
7 2
Injunctions against litigants or courts are unlikely to provide a satisfac-
tory solution. Parallel state sovereignties probably lack the authority to
enforce their orders.17 3 A federal court's authority to enjoin a pending
168. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 81.
169. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
170. Cf Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978) (when federal court is
prohibited by Anti-Injunction Act from issuing stay, both suits may proceed, and race results), cert.
granted, 440 U.S. 944, cert. dismissed, 442 U.S. 925 (1979).
171. The argument that defendants had unfairly influenced the choice of forum was part of the
plaintiffs' argument, for example, in In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab.
Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). See generally Motion
for Leave and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Plaintiffs in the Dalkon Shield IUD Products Lia-
bility Litigation, Gillette Co. v. Miner, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
172. Cf Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp. 489 F.2d 933, 935 n.5 (7th Cir. 1973) (labeling
race "unseemly").
173. Some authority does exist for a court enjoining the parties before it from pursuing other
litigation. E.g., State ex rel. General Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo. 1978)
(power is "clear" but should be used "with great caution"); see also Brown v. Brown, 387 A.2d 1051
(R.I. 1978) (divorce action); PPG Indus. v. Continental Oil Co., 492 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) ("There can be no doubt that the District Court. . . had the power, in a proper case, to
restrain persons in its jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in other states.").
These cases, however, depend upon the exercise of authority over persons actually before the court,
and over whom it has jurisdiction. The courts have never addressed the question whether a state court
can "certify a mandatory class action and. . . enjoin other courts from proceeding. . . ." Wright &
Colussi, The Successful Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of the Skywalks Mass
Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. Rav. 141, 148 n.28 (1984).
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state action is circumscribed by the Anti-Injunction Act, 74 which protects
federalism by preventing these orders, with narrow exceptions.17 5 Perhaps
the statute's exceptions allowing injunctions to protect a federal court's
jurisdiction,' or to prevent relitigation of its orders, might be stretched to
authorize injunctions in the competing class action situation, but the
doubtful validity of these orders itself presents difficulties. 7 Federalism
concerns also should prompt restraint. A better solution would be for the
less appropriate forum to stay (or, in some cases, dismiss) its own
proceedings."7 8
Thus far, competing multistate class actions have not been frequent
enough to create a highly visible problem. The situation has occurred,'"9
however, and it is possible that the Shutts holding will give rise to more.
If so, the recognition of comity principles may enable the courts to avoid
wasteful proceedings in which they spend years determining where litiga-
tion will take place or whether there can be parallel state and federal
proceedings. 8
Occasionally, the second forum will issue a counter-injunction restraining enforcement of an injunc-
tion. See, e.g., James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Il. 2d 356, 363-67, 152 N.E.2d 858, 862-64
(1958). This procedure exacerbates the conflict. See Comment, Injunctions Against Suits in Foreign
Jurisdictions, 10 LA. L. REV. 302, 302-12 (1950); Note, State Injunction of Proceedings in Federal
Courts, 75 YALE L.J. 150 (1965).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
175. The statute creates exceptions in three situations: first, "as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress"; second, "where necessary in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction"; and third, "to protect
or effectuate its judgments." Id. See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS §§ 4223-26 (1984 & Supp.
1986) [hereinafter 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER] (discussing exceptions).
176. Courts have applied this exception to situations involving property in the custody of a federal
court and to cases analogous to in rem proceedings, such as school desegregation suits, in which it has
been necessary to prevent state court interference with continuing jurisdiction. See 17 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 175, § 4225. Perhaps a similar analogy could be made to some kinds
of class actions, particularly those brought under subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 23. See infra Section
III(A).
177. Cf In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.) (holding mandatory class certifi-
cation to be injunction and therefore in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2283), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982).
178. See infra notes 485-86 and accompanying text.
179. "It is not unusual for a particular course of conduct to prompt contemporaneous class suits
in a number of jurisdictions." Note, Multistate Class Actions, supra note 2, at 738 n.153 (citing In re
Glenn W. Turner Enter. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1975)). Another example is In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), in which overlapping actions were filed in state and
federal courts. Judge Wright, who presided over the federal action, later wrote that justice in such a
case "can only be accomplished through the use of the mandatory class action device." Wright &
Colussi, supra note 173, at 150.
180. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), affd in part,
vacated in part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986) (lengthy litigation over certifi-
cation decision).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1, 1986
2. The Imposition of Litigation Burdens upon Class Members
In Shutts, the Supreme Court concluded that burdens imposed upon
class members ordinarily would be insubstantial. It was convinced that
class members rarely would be subjected to expensive discovery, counter-
claims, costs, or attorneys' fees. 81 Therefore, the Court expressly declined
to decide whether maintenance of an opt-out multistate class action impos-
ing substantial burdens on class members would be consistent with due
process. 182
One situation in which real burdens may be placed on class plaintiffs is
mass tort litigation in which individual injuries and damage amounts dif-
fer.183 Discovery of each individual's damages might be necessary. Coun-
terclaims in commercial litigation present another prospect. 84 The Shutts
case itself provides an example. Federal authorities sometimes have or-
dered natural gas refunds that producers either must collect from royalty
owners or pay themselves from earnings. 85 The possibility of a conven-
ient nationwide forum, in which such a claim could be offset against a
class recovery, might enhance the economy of collection. Phillips, in fact,
did plead a counterclaim for any sums it might be due from any member
of the class.'
The Supreme Court may have been justified in treating these concerns
181. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
182. "We are convinced that such burdens are rarely imposed upon plaintiff class members, and
that the disposition of these issues is best left to a case which presents them in a more concrete way."
105 S. Ct. at 2974 n.2.
183. Cf. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument of defendant
who claimed surprise owing to testimony of unnamed class members, on ground that defendant should
have attempted discovery from class members), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). Damage differ-
ences, although a significant issue in some cases, frequently may be dealt with by bifurcation, use of
affidavit procedures managed by claims settlement services, or special masters.
184. See Steinman, The Party Status of Absent Plaintiff Class Members: Vulnerability to Coun-
terclaims, 69 GEo. L.J. 1171 (1981).
185. Thus, for example, producers faced with making refunds to pipeline companies, because of a
method of computing Btu content of gas that was invalidated in court, sought a means to offset the
refunds against amounts collectible from companies because of the producers' likely inability to collect
these amounts from royalty owners, whom they had paid without deducting the amounts in question.
FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No. 1483, at 3 (Sept. 13, 1984). The ultimate denial of this offset request,
however, meant that producers were unable to recover except from the royalty owners to whom they
had made payment. Interstate Nat. Gas Ass'n of Am. v. FERC, 756 F.2d 166, 170-71 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 139 (1985). These amounts could not be offset against future royalties with-
out danger of lease termination; hence, producers were reduced to collecting from royalty owners out
of pocket, if at all. The small size of the amounts due from large numbers of dispersed royalty owners
made this alternative difficult as a practical matter.
186. Joint Appendix, supra note 46, at 14-15. The counterclaim sought offset of any amounts
due Phillips, indemnity from any class member that was a producer for which Phillips had performed
accounting services, administrative expenses incurred by Phillips in obtaining higher gas prices, and
interest on any payments by any producer class member to Phillips pursuant to the Federal Power
Commission opinions at issue. Most of the claimants who were possible objects of the counterclaim
apparently were oil and gas producers and opted out of the litigation; hence the counterclaim was not
a part of any further proceedings.
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as less weighty than the efficiency gains of multistate class actions. In any
event, the Court's cost-benefit reasoning may provide a glimpse of the an-
swer that its opinion declined to provide directly. If the burdens upon
class members are significant and the expected recovery for each member
is small, the due process balance should tip against jurisdiction. 1 7 But if
the economy of a class action is great, the prospect of some inconvenience
to claimants, such as discovery requirements, should not necessarily end
the action.
3. Equitable Relief and Defendant Classes
The reasoning in Shutts arguably supports the assertion of claims
against defendant classes, one or more members of which lack minimum
contacts with the forum. It also may support class actions for equitable
relief. However, the facts in Shutts did not present issues raised by these
types of actions and, therefore, the Court expressly reserved both
questions.188
Equitable relief appears in a variety of forms. Some equitable remedies,
such as restitution, might present the same issues in the class action con-
text as ordinary damages.' A nationwide class action for injunctive relief
against the defendant's repeated conduct may raise more serious problems.
For example, a nationwide class of debtors might sue a creditor to enjoin
automobile repossessions that assertedly are unlawful. Should the decision
of a court in one state be binding upon nonresident class "members" who
failed to opt out, even if courts in their respective states might reach dif-
ferent results?
The issue might be viewed more appropriately as one of the policy un-
derlying res judicata and collateral estoppel, rather than as unique to class
187. The courts arrived at a similar approach prior to Shutts. Compare Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins., 450 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 1971) (enforcing requirement that absent class mem-
bers respond to interrogatories requesting information "actually needed in preparation for trial and
.. . not used to take unfair advantage of 'absent' class members"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972)
with Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 & n.24 (7th Cir.) (refusing to require
answers to questions that "would have required the assistance of technical and legal advice"), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); cf. Gruenberger, Discovery from Class Members: A Fertile Field for
Abuse, 4 LITIGATION 35 (Fall 1977) (discussing abusive discovery practice against absent class
members).
188. "We intimate no view concerning either types of class action lawsuits, such as those seeking
equitable relief. Nor, of course, does our discussion of personal jurisdiction address class actions where
the jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant class." 105 S. Ct. at 2975 n.3 (emphasis in original).
189. Restitution differs from damage remedies in that its objective is to cause the defendant to
disgorge unjust enrichment rather than to compensate for actual loss, but it resembles damages in that
it is measured in monetary terms. D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 4.1-.9
(1973). Although technically different from equitable remedies generally, restitution partakes of the
character of "substantive" equity, or the discretion exercised by courts to effectuate individual justice.
Id. § 4.1. It is related closely to the equitable remedy of constructive trust, which also is designed to
redress unjust enrichment. Id. § 4.3.
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actions. Thus, res judicata may not bar a later court from reaching a dif-
ferent result because policy exceptions would support nonrecognition of
preclusive effect. 190 Exceptions to the binding effect of the action, how-
ever, would tend to undercut the basis upon which Shutts was decided: the
Court expressly recognized the binding effect of multistate opt-in class
actions as a matter of fairness to the defendant. 9
Yet another reason for the Court's reservation of the equitable-relief
class action may be the absence of a notice requirement in cases calling for
uniform declaratory or injunctive relief." 2 The civil rights class action
seeking to declare a statute unconstitutional is the prototype.' 93 Strictly
speaking, class relief may be unnecessary because a nonclass declaration of
unconstitutionality would benefit the entire class as a consequence of stare
decisis.194 It is customary, however, for class relief to be sought so that the
action will not become moot when, for example, test case parties die, or
plaintiffs in a prison dispute are paroled, or an abortion case lasts more
than nine months. 9 Again, the real issue concerns preclusion doctrines.
These judgments should be given persuasive authority status or stare deci-
sis effect, but one jurisdiction with an aberrant view ought not to have
power to bind the nation.'
With respect to defendant classes, Shutts cuts in different directions.
The Court's approval of jurisdiction over claimants is based upon the un-
likelihood of relief against the class, and this reasoning tends to oppose
jurisdiction over multistate defendant classes in the absence of forum con-
tacts. On the other hand, the Court's broad cost-benefit analysis tends to
support jurisdiction, at least if the burdens upon defendants in individual
litigation significantly would outweigh those of a class defense.'
97
For example, in Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec-
tronics, Inc.," I the plaintiff sued a class of defendants, asserting various
claims related to patent infringement. In a clearly reasoned opinion, the
district court held that the action satisfied Rule 23 and therefore certified
190. "Principles of res judicata are not ironclad. This court has frequently stated that res judicata
will not be applied when it contravenes an important public policy." Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399,
408 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted) (allowing individual plaintiff's suit for money damages against
prison system after class action covering similar transaction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
191. See generally infra Section II(F).
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(2)-(3). Some courts have held that notice in subdivision b(1) or
b(2) actions is required by the Constitution. See infra note 263.
193. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 1776.
194. Id.
195. Id. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (challenge to prison system brought as
class action to avoid mootness), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
196. See supra note 190; see also infra Section II(F).
197. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
198. 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Il1. 1968); see Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIo ST. L.J.
459 (1977); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978); Note, Personal Jurisdic-
tion and Rule 23 Defendant Class Actions, 53 IND. L.J. 841 (1978).
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it-without recognizing the jurisdictional issue. Technograph may be the
type of case in which the multistate jurisdiction recognized in Shutts
should be applied to a class of defendants. A patent holder, faced with
flagrant acts of infringers too numerous to sue individually, 99 is as de-
serving of an economical forum as are the members of a plaintiff class
with small claims.200
A different result might be appropriate in a damage suit against a de-
fendant class without minimum contacts, 201 although the nature and out-
come of such actions are difficult to predict if Shutts encourages their use.
Finally, a difficult case is presented by the possibility that a defendant in
Phillips' position might outmaneuver plaintiffs' attorneys by filing an ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment that it owes nothing to the class claim-
ants.20 2 The action may seem suspect in that the defendant's principal
motive may be forum shopping; however, since Shutts provides the plain-
tiff class with powerful forum-shopping tools, it is not easy to explain
why defendants cannot also use them. 03
D. Federal Courts, Statewide Actions, and Forums with Minimum
Contacts: Does Shutts Apply?
1. Shutts and the Federal Courts
At first blush, it seems clear that the Shutts due process criteria must
apply to federal as well as state courts. It has been argued, however, that
the Fifth Amendment due process clause, which is applicable to the fed-
eral government, is less restrictive than the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause, which was the provision at issue in Shutts.2°, Proponents
of mandatory classes also argue that Supreme Court decisions uphold
199. In the case of patents, venue statutes may prevent joinder of individual defendants in a single
forum. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS-
DICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2D § 3823 (1986) [hereinafter 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
200. In Rule 23(b)(3) actions, the literal terms of the rule would allow defendant class members
to opt out. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). This right, if widely exercised, would destroy the effective-
ness of the class device. In Technograph, the trial judge apparently avoided this result by certifying
the action pursuant to each of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).
201. Defendant actions are simpler if brought on a statewide, rather than nationwide, basis. Cf.
Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lombard v.
Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1980) (defendant class of 42 sheriffs certified in action concerning New York
county jails); Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Il1. 1983)
(defendant class including members of Illinois trade association certified in antitrust case).
202. This tactic may be confined to statewide actions, see infra Section II(D)(2), or to mandatory
actions. See infra Section III.
203. A declaratory victory for the party opposing the class has the same effect as a take-nothing
judgment in a plaintiff class action.
204. The argument is asserted, for example, in Brief of Appellees at 30, In re Asbestos School
Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986) (No. 84-1642).
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Congress' authority to provide for nationwide service of process. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad,'" the Court said:
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims is
not confined by geographical boundaries ....
There is, therefore, nothing in the Constitution which forbids
Congress to enact that ...any [federal trial court] ...shall, by
process served anywhere in the United States, have the power to
bring before it all the parties necessary to its decision.
The Shutts opinion, on the other hand, speaks directly to the power only
of the states. Therefore, federal courts are not affected by Shutts206-or so
the argument goes.
This reasoning, however, is subject to question. Although it technically
is accurate to say that the Fifth Amendment provides a "different due
process"1207 than the Fourteenth Amendment, the two clauses have been
construed to produce generally similar208 meanings.209 Moreover, even if
distinctions might be drawn between the territorial reach of state and fed-
eral courts in some contexts, it seems difficult to justify due process differ-
ences affecting notice and opt-out protection provided by Shutts when the
alternative is to bind nonconsenting litiganis by adjudication in forums
205. 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878); see also Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
442 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925).
206. Several courts have upheld nationwide jurisdiction in cases concerning federal claims when
Congress has so provided. See Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). In Mariash, the
defendants argued that notice and opportunity to be heard were not sufficient to establish the jurisdic-
tion of a federal court in New York over them, and that minimum contacts with that state were
required. The court responded by holding:
It is not the State of New York but the United States "which would exercise its jurisdiction
over [the defendants]." And plainly, where, as here, the defendants reside within the territorial
boundaries of the United States, the "minimal contacts," required to justify the federal govern-
ment's exercise of power over them, are present.
Id. at 1143 (quoting Brief of Appellees at 15) (citations omitted); see also FTC v. Jim Walter Corp.,
651 F.2d 251, 255-57 (5th Cir. 1981); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 & n.4 (7th Cir.
1979); First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel & Dixon & Co., 634 F. Supp. 1341
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 2D § 1067.1 (1986) [hereinafter 4 WRIGHT & MILLER].
207. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 412-14 (2d ed. 1983).
208. See Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8
VILL. L. REV. 520, 535 (1963) (suggesting that Fifth Amendment might imply some requirement of
relationship between action and forum); Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1984) (suggesting due process balancing
test, including federal interests); Stephens, The Federal Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits
on Federal Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 697, 719-22 (1984)
(same); cf. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 207, at 415-22 (discussing clauses
interchangeably and citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973)).
209. For example, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985) concerns the juris-
diction of a federal district court over a defendant's person. Burger King applies the International
Shoe standard, uses as authority cases dealing with state courts, and draws no distinction between
federal and state forums with respect to the applicability of the minimum contacts test.
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with which they have no affiliation. The disadvantages of distant forum
abuse are not mitigated by the forum's federal rather than state character.
Furthermore, the nationwide service argument ignores the fact that
Congress has not provided for this service in federal class actions. Propo-
nents might argue that congressional authority is found in Rule 23 itself.
Even assuming that the Rule is a "congressional" enactment, however, the
authority can be found only by very broad implication, because the Rule
does not address service of process or jurisdiction.210 Rule 4, which does,
adopts service limits similar to those of the forum state.21 It seems doubt-
ful, therefore, that federal courts should be excused212 from requirements
that Shutts declares 213 fundamental to due process.
214
2. Jurisdiction Not Based on Consent: Statewide Class Actions and
Forums with Minimum Contacts
If all class members have an affiliation with the forum, the court can
compel appearance, and the inference of consent is unnecessary. 2 5 Notice
and an opportunity to be heard probably still would be required as inde-
pendent due process guarantees,21 ' but the right to opt out presumably
could be denied. It is even conceivable that cheaper notice, such as the
substitutes provided by some state class action rules, 217 would be accept-
210. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) may strengthen the argument in that it provides for notice by mail
but imposes no territorial limitations. This reasoning, however, should be compared with statutes in
which Congress has provided expressly for nationwide service. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982)
(mandamus directed to federal officer); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982) (interpleader).
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(O.
212. Some courts upholding nationwide service have based that result upon the applicability of
federal question jurisdiction, as opposed to diversity jurisdiction. E.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v.
Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984) ("nationwide service for federal question cases
[does not] fall short of requirements of due process"). This reasoning implicates a knotty Erie doctrine
problem. However, it seems unlikely that the Erie doctrine would countermand an otherwise proper
nationwide service provision even in a diversity case. See infra note 534.
213. The Shutts opinion refers at several points to "state courts." For example, it says, "Because
States place fewer burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than they do upon absent defendants in non-
class suits, the Due Process Clause need not and does not afford the former as much protection from
state-court jurisdiction as it does the latter." 105 S. Ct. at 2975. However, this reference seems more
readily explained by the Shutts Court's focus on the state as the source of possible due process impair-
ment, than by the possibility that the Court was distinguishing federal courts from state courts.
214. See 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
215. This result follows from the line of cases based upon International Shoe. See cases cited
supra note 10.
216. Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (separately ana-
lyzing personal jurisdiction and notice requirements).
217. See supra note 146. Before Shutts, a Special Committee of the Litigation Section of the
American Bar Association had recommended elimination of the individual notice requirement in favor
of a discretionary notice provision, permitting the court to tailor both the group to be notified and the
method of notice to the particular case. See Gruenberger, Plans for Class Action Reform, Nat'l L.J.,
July 8, 1985, at 32, col. 1, at 33 (reporting recommendations of Special Committee on Class Action
Improvements). Even though Shutts does not address the question whether an appropriately drafted
and exercised discretionary provision would be constitutional, the literal language of the decision indi-
cates that such a provision would be unconstitutional.
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able in an action in which traditional jurisdictional requirements are
met.
218
The removal of the consent requirement might be important in mass
disaster cases. For example, In re Federal Skywalk Cases219 concerned the
collapse of certain structures in the Hyatt Hotel in Kansas City, Mis-
souri. All claims resulted from a single event in a single state, and all
claimants probably had sufficient contacts with that state to support its
exercise of traditional personal jurisdiction. Arguably, both efficiency and
just adjudication would be enhanced, in this kind of case, by joining all
claimants in a single class action.220 In Skywalk, the court of appeals disal-
lowed this result because of the federal anti-injunction statute.221 Nothing
in Shutts, however, prevents a state from empowering its courts to require
joinder or a federal court from proceeding when the absence of previously
commenced state court litigation meant the Anti-Injunction Act was not
an obstacle. Conversely, defendants in Skywalk-type circumstances might
seek unified litigation by requesting declaratory relief against the class of
claimants in state court at the site of the disaster, and the court probably
could compel joinder.
Shutts obviously facilitates the filing of nationwide actions without min-
imum contacts. As the Skywalk example shows, however, there still may
be advantages to statewide actions or class litigation based upon minimum
contacts. Contacts less weighty than those required to bind defendants
might be sufficient to support this result for plaintiff classes; the true com-
mon fund cases, for example, hint at this possibility.22 Furthermore, as
suggested below, choice of law probably will present significant manage-
ment difficulties in some nationwide actions.223 Denial of nationwide cer-
tification then could present another situation in which statewide class ac-
tions would be useful.
E. Interstate Federalism and State Sovereignty: How Much Is Left?
The International Shoe22 4 test sometimes has been viewed as a protec-
tion against one state's infringement of another's sovereignty. Thus, in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,225 the Court said:
218. Shutts provides no authority for this kind of notice, however, and its doubtful validity might
make its use unwise. The amount at issue in each claim may be so small that binding effect is unim-
portant, but otherwise the risk of an invalid decree ordinarily will be excessive.
219. 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). See generally infra notes
308-13 and accompanying text.
220. See infra Section III(C)(3).
221. See infra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
224. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
225. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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The concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-
equal sovereigns in a federal system.22
Arguably, the Kansas court in Shutts and the Illinois court in Gillette
acted in derogation of the interstate federalism concern, which is expressed
in statements tracing back to International Shoe.
However, in such cases as Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
Des Bauxites De Guinee,2 7 the Court indicated that this interstate feder-
alism concern was a less significant objective than the individual liberty
interests of parties.228 The Shutts opinion concluded, consistently with
Bauxites and contrary to World-Wide Volkswagen, that interstate federal-
ism is not relevant to personal jurisdiction.229 This holding probably was
necessary if the Court was to preserve the economic advantages it ascribed
to multistate class actions. 230 But it raises the question whether there are
valid interests that will be left unprotected by the abandonment of the
World-Wide Volkswagen approach.
Miner v. Gillette Co.2 31 provides a striking example of the interstate
federalism concern. The company gave away hundreds of thousands of
items in a promotional effort but underestimated demand. It offered a re-
fund and substitute to the remaining applicants. The class complaint
charged that this conduct constituted a deceptive concealment by Gillette
of the fact that it did not have sufficient merchandise to give to all who
asked.
There are two ways in which a conscientious state government might
regard such a class claim. The Supreme Court of Illinois evidently consid-
226. Id. at 291-92. The Court also concluded that the jurisdictional limit of due process was "an
instrument of interstate federalism," which protects the "orderly administration of the laws" of other
states. Id. at 294 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
227. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
228. Id. at 702 n.10.
229. The Court quoted Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702-03, to the effect that the personal jurisdiction
aspect of due process "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as
a matter of individual liberty." Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2973. The federalism theme still may exist in
personal jurisdiction, but it is "no more than a by-product." Drobak, The Federalism Theme in
Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. REv. 1015, 1065 (1983).
230. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. It should be pointed out, however, that Phillips
argued that a single class action might be appropriate in Oklahoma, since each class member had
accepted royalties paid from that state. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 45. If, as seems possible,
appropriate forums similarly could be found for most nationwide class actions, the economic argument
would be weakened.
:231. 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S.
86 (1982).
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ered it a valuable regulatory protection for consumers 23 ' Another reason-
able view, however, is that the suit would raise costs disproportionate to
its putative benefits to all consumers, both in Illinois and in every other
state.2"3 A state other than Illinois might conclude that the labelling of
apparently innocuous conduct as deceptive reduces the availability of
goods and services,2 3 4 because producers must protect themselves from un-
predictable liability.2 35 The ease of blackmail, 3 ' disproportionate enrich-
ment of class counsel,237 and frustration of state policy that result from
even conscientious efforts to adjudicate fifty states' laws,2 38 might be fur-
ther concerns to such a state. Particularly when, as in Gillette, there is no
monetary loss to any consumer and potential recoveries are only a few
dollars, a thoughtful state citizenry might choose to avoid these
disadvantages.
For example, Oregon has a carefully designed state policy, originally
expressed in a statute, deliberately narrowing class actions. 39 The Oregon
Supreme Court has noted that:
232. 87 Ill. 2d at 18-19, 428 N.E.2d at 484.
233. Some commentary in Illinois has harshly criticized of Miner. See Note, Illinois Multistate
Plaintiff Class Actions: Abrogation of Jurisdictional Limitations on State Sovereignty, 31 DE PAUL
L. REV. 471, 496 (1982) (Miner "invites an onslaught of trivial suits to be filed in Illinois courts,
suits that the state will have little reason to consider"). For articles favoring the Miner holding, see
Ross, Multistate Consumer Class Actions in Illinois, 57 CH.[-]KENT L. REV. 397 (1981) (authored
by member of firm that served as plaintiffs' class counsel); Drobak, supra note 229, at 1064-65;
Comment, supra note 2, at 806-10.
234. A state also might conclude that the labelling of ostensibly honest conduct as deceptive trivi-
alizes the law and results in oppression.
235. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 170-71 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing tort and
contract doctrines that tie liability to foreseeability of injury).
236. Id. at 566. "The lawyer for the class will be tempted to offer to settle with the defendant for
a small judgment and a larger legal fee. . . .Although the judge must approve the settlement, the
lawyers largely control his access to information." Id. at 531.
237. See Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Action Adjudications To Provide an
Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1002, 1021-22 (1971).
For example, in Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1983), the
court upheld an attorney's fee award of $246,517 although actual payable claims proved to be only
$17,482. This example may be unusual because claims against the $2 million settlement fund may
have been discouraged by the trial court's rulings. See Crump & Crump, The Year's Developments in
Civil Procedure, 16 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 115, 124-25 (1985). From an economic point of view, one
might approve of this payment into a liability fund even if injured parties do not ultimately recover
damages, because the creation of the fund itself internalizes social costs.
238. See infra Section IV(D).
239. OR. R. Civ. P. 32(B)(3). The most significant local restriction imposed by the Rule is that,
in the local analogues to Rule 23(b)(3) actions,
[clommon questions . . . shall not be deemed to predominate . . . if the court finds it likely
that final determination of the action will require separate adjudications of the claims of nu-
merous members of the class, unless the separate adjudications relate primarily to the calcula-
tion of damages.
OR. R. Civ. P. 32(B)(3). This provision would prevent most class recovery of non-economic damages,
for example, and could prevent even economic recoveries unless they were mathematically
ascertainable.
Another provision requires the likelihood of "significant" relief to class members as compared to the
complexity and expense of the action and prohibits certification when individual claims are "insuffi-
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There can be no doubt that the purpose of the amendments was to
prevent abuses perceived under Rule 23 . . .and that the scope of
the class action in Oregon was intended to be circumscribed to a
greater extent than is the case under some federal courts' interpreta-
tion of Rule 23.240
Oregon's policy may be seen as similar to tax or other economic conces-
sions that a state might offer to stimulate business. Ultimately, the pur-
pose is to benefit Oregon citizens by sparing them from having the costs of
regulation passed on to them. 41
However, Oregon's citizens cannot effectively benefit themselves eco-
nomically by limiting class actions they consider abusive, because those
very actions can be brought in other states with Oregon citizens included
if embraced by the claims. The opt-out right is an ineffective solution to
this concern because Oregon residents would likely refuse to opt out, thus
benefitting by undermining Oregon's policy. Mass-marketed products, if
priced uniformly nationwide, may not be affected; but products or services
such as intrastate transportation or consumer credit, which often are
priced locally even if provided by national firms, may become more ex-
pensive in Oregon than they otherwise would be. Forums such as Kansas
or Illinois thus will impose upon Oregon the economic costs that it has
sought to avoid.
The Court's holding in Shutts may be justified by the resulting effi-
ciency gains. However, the removal of personal jurisdiction as a protection
of interstate federalism puts greater emphasis upon choice of law, which
was the protection the court did provide. Trial courts also may protect
interstate federalism by taking it into account in class certification and
forum contests.
242
cient in the amounts . . . involved." OR. R. Civ. P. 32(B)(3)(e). This provision could be interpreted
against certification in a case such as Miner. See also OR. R. Civ. P. 32(B)(3)(f) (certification may
take account of probability of success on merits); OR. R. Civ. P. 32(H) (requires prelitigation notice
to defendant and opportunity to cure); OR. R. Civ. P. 32(I) (prohibits damage claims if defendant
identifies potential class members, offers to compensate for injury within reasonable time, and ceases
offending actions).
240. Bernard v. First Nat'l Bank, 275 Or. 145, 152, 550 P.2d 1203, 1208 (1976); see also Wilcox
v. First Interstate Bank, 97 F.R.D. 440, 447 (D. Or. 1983) (denying certification of bank borrower
class, considering Bernard as persuasive authority), appeal docketed, No. 85-3640 (9th Cir. 1985).
241. Similarly, the Uniform Class Actions Act respects the concerns of interstate federalism
through a process of comity that the minimum contacts test has been interpreted to respect through
individual due process. See UNIFORM CLAss ACTIONS ACT § 6 (court of one state may exercise
jurisdiction over residents of another state to the extent that the latter state has made its residents
subject to suit in the former). Only North Dakota has adopted the reciprocal feature of the Uniform
Act, however. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(0. See generally Scher, Uniform Class Actions: A Critical
View, 63 A.B.A. J. 840 (1977) (discussing Uniform Act).
242. See infra Section V(A)-(B).
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F. Binding Effect: The Application of Preclusion Doctrines
Before Shutts, the fifty state supreme courts were not clearly required
to give res judicata effect to judgments rendered by courts without per-
sonal jurisdiction over class claimants.2 " Some refused to give that ef-
fect.244 Defendants therefore could not know whether judgments in multi-
state class actions would protect them.24
Doubts about binding effect before Shutts were especially undesirable
when a defendant wished to pursue a settlement overture. Settlement is
strongly favored because class actions are uncertain and costly.246 A de-
fendant without assurance of binding effect was likely to be subjected to a
"heads you win, tails I lose" approach. If it settled for an amount that
plaintiffs elsewhere might think was inadequate, a defendant might fear
that nonresident class members over whom the court had no jurisdiction
would relitigate in their home forums and be sympathetically received.
247
The Supreme Court, in Shutts, recognized the defendant's "distinct and
personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by res judicata
just as [the defendant] is bound. '2 48 The Court's decision stands for the
proposition that binding effect does attach in multistate class actions under
the conditions prescribed in Shutts. The Court's discussion is general,
however, and the opinion points out that "a court adjudicating a dispute
may not be able to predetermine the res judicata effect of its own judg-
ment. '24  Therefore, issues regarding the breadth of or conditions for
claim preclusion may persist after Shutts.
For example, a state court might determine that notice issued by an-
other court did not properly describe the suit, or inadequately explained
class plaintiffs' rights, or failed to include an appropriate opt-out form.
2 50
This holding would mean that a defendant settling a class action might be
243. Cf Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2972 (recognizing Phillips' interest in determination of jurisdiction
issue).
244. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
245. See Note, Multistate Class Actions, supra note 2, at 734-43; Note, Binding Effect of Class
Actions, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1059 (1954).
246. See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3018 (1985) ("settlements rather than litigation will
serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants"); cf. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 455
(5th Cir. 1983) (settlements of shareholder derivative suits "particularly favored" because of difficulty
of litigation).
247. Before Shutts, it could be said that "[clollateral attacks on class judgments have usually
succeeded." Note, Multistate Class Actions, supra note 2, at 737 n.150. In fact, an illustration can be
found in an action parallel to Shutts. Amoco Production Company paid interest at rates provided by
various state laws, believing it thus had discharged its liability, but then was sued for the greater
amounts allegedly due under Kansas law. Dudley v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 5188 (Dist. Ct. Stevens
County, Kan. 1986).
248. 105 S. Ct. at 2972.
249. Id.
250. See supra Section II(B)(2).
Vol. 96: 1, 1986
Multistate Class Actions After Shutts
held liable for a recovery exceeding the settlement amount.2 51 To mini-
mize these occurrences, a court hearing a class action should take care in
giving notice, and the court in the second suit should be liberal in ac-
cepting it, in light of the inherent difficulty of achieving perfect notice.
2 52
Additional issues may be raised by the confusing law of res judicata and
collateral estoppel itself.253 Some courts, for example, do not impose a
broad procedural duty upon the plaintiff to bring all related claims in a
single action, but rather allow a second suit, even covering the same dis-
pute, if the substantive claim technically is different. 2 "5 Likewise, factual
differences can prevent preclusive effect.255 Finally, many jurisdictions
recognize vaguely defined limits on preclusion as a matter of public pol-
icy. 256 In a subsequent class suit, skillful counsel would advance all of
these exceptions to preclusion, and together they may provide the forum
with considerable wiggle room to protect its residents from an assertedly
inadequate settlement.
2 57
Although the phenomenon of the subsequent suit after resolution of a
class action has not been common,258 it has occurred.2 59 The question re-
mains whether increasing resort to the class action device will produce
more multiple litigation in which defendants are subjected to the "heads
you win, tails I lose" syndrome. It should be added that the class fre-
quently is not only interstate but also international, as was the class in
251. The full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1, could be asserted in favor of
binding effect, but for that effect to attach, the first court must have had jurisdiction; jurisdiction, in
turn, is conditioned upon satisfactory compliance with the due process criteria set forth in Shutts.
252. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text (discussing notice difficulties); see also infra
text accompanying notes 501-04 (discussing inevitable differences in appropriate notice).
253. See generally R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, supra note 22, ch. VII; 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MAT-
TERS § 4455 (1981).
254. E.g., Griffin v. Holiday Inns of Am., 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973) (subsequent suit on
quantum meruit theory not barred by res judicata after suit on contract theory concerning same trans-
action, although barred under compulsory counterclaim theory). It has been said that the Texas Su-
preme Court follows a "functional ad hoe" approach to res judicata. W. DORsANEO & D. CRUMP,
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 8-4 (2d ed. 1983) (citing Gilbert v. Fireside
Enter., 611 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)); see also Cleary, ResJudicata Reexamined, 57 YALE
L.J. 339, 346 (1948) (advocating res judicata rules allowing separate actions for relief but not on
different legal theories).
255. E.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Kownslar, 496 S.W. 2d 535 (Tex. 1973) (final judgment
in suit on guaranty does not preclude subsequent suit on same guaranty concerning other outstanding
notes).
256. See supra note 190.
257. See Note, Multistate Class Actions, supra note 2, at 738-40 (discussing preclusive effect).
258. Cf supra note 27 (discussing improbability of individual plaintiff relitigating cause of action
in which class lost).
259. E.g., Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs,
237 U.S. 662 (1915); Johnson v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1984); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d
399 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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Shutts.60 Preclusive effect then becomes a matter of international or
transnational law.2 6 '
III. MANDATORY CLASS ACTIONS AFTER SHUTTS
Before Shutts, not every class action was subject to notice and opt-out
requirements. By its express terms, Rule 23 imposes these requirements
only in actions under subdivision (b)(3), in which common question pre-
dominance and superiority over other procedures support class certifica-
tion.2 62 The rule contains no provision for notice or opt-out in class ac-
tions certified under subdivision (b)(1), in which risk of inconsistency
justifies unified treatment, or under subdivision (b)(2), in which injunctive
or declaratory relief is at issue. s6
Subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) have given birth to the so-called
"mandatory" class action, in which class members are denied the right to
opt out.264 Proponents of mandatory class certification can claim support
not only from the absence of express notice or opt-out provisions in the
rule, but also from the implicit preference for unitary adjudication that
underlies subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2).265 These arguments typically are
accompanied by the claim that widespread opt-out will prevent the fair
and efficient determination of the particular dispute at issue. In fact, a
special committee of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion has recommended the amendment of Rule 23 to allow flexible use of
mandatory certification in all class actions for this reason.266
260. See supra text accompanying note 47.
261. Similar concerns arose, for example, in suits for damages from the Bhopal Disaster. In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). The Indian government addressed the issue by passing a law enabling it to sue in the United
States as the "exclusive" representative of all victims, although the status of the Indian government in
the action had not been determined. Riley, New Bhopal Law May Affect Future Role of U.S. Law-
yers, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 11, 1985, at 4, col. 2. In suits already filed, the exclusive representation provi-
sion applies only "as [the] court . . . permits." Id. The federal district judge handling the cases thus
far has not ruled on whether the Indian government's representation is exclusive of individual counsel.
These concerns may be moot, however, since the district court dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds. 634 F. Supp. at 866-67.
262. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2).
263. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(l)-(2). However, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) empowers the court to tailor
its orders to the needs of the case, and some courts have held that prejudgment notice in subdivision
(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions is required by the Constitution if money damages are at issue. E.g., Johnson
v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979). Contra Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d
1167, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affld on other grounds, 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
264. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 49-58; Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions:
"Playing Fair" with National Classes, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1487, 1501 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
National Classes]; Note, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in the Certification of Mandatory
Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517, 529-34 (1983)
[hereinafter Note, Mechanical Problems].
265. See infra Section III(A)(1).
266. Gruenberger, Plans for Class-Action Reform, Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1985, at 32, col. 1 (report-
ing recommendations of Special Committee on Class Action Improvements); see also N.Y. CiV. PRAC.
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Although Shutts does not address the issue directly, 8 7 the concept, ex-
pressed in Shutts, that the right to opt out is a fundamental due process
requirement 268 seems to contradict the mandatory class action that has
developed under Federal Rule 23 and its state counterparts. There can be
no mandatory class if the members have the constitutional right to opt out.
The conclusion seems to follow that Shutts prohibits mandatory classes.
The question is both important and controversial. The prospect of
mandatory class certification has motivated strenuous efforts by some at-
torneys to characterize their actions as falling within subdivision (b)(1) or
(b)(2).2" For plaintiffs' counsel, a mandatory class may reduce conflicts
among claimants, increase efficiency, provide for equitable distribution of
the recovery, and, not incidentally, provide a large, captive group for
counsel to represent. For the defendant, mandatory class certification may
provide a single convenient forum, lower litigation costs, and reduce the
possibility of inappropriate multiple liability, particularly for punitive
damages. Mandatory certification also may increase prospects for settle-
ment by preventing claimants from increasing the defendant's perceived
litigation costs by the threat of opt-out. On the other hand, there are al-
ways some claimants or defendants who oppose mandatory classes because
they see individual, as opposed to group, control as essential to the fair
presentation of their cases. The following sections explore this controversy
over mandatory class certifications in light of Shutts, and conclude with a
suggested four-factor analysis to assist courts with these determinations.
A. The Uses of Mandatory Classes
1. Mandatory Classes for Limited Funds and Common Rights
Mandatory classes find historical precedent in the equitable bill of
peace.2 70 This procedure developed as a means of preventing multiple
suits concerning common questions, particularly those in which many peo-
L. & R. 903 (McKinney's 1977) (class members may be permitted to opt out when "appropriate");
infra Section III(A)(2).
267. See Byer, National Mandatory Class Actions: Key Questions Remain Unanswered, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 19, col. 1, at 21, col. 2 (Shutts "was not a mandatory class action, and the
court [sic] stated in a footnote that its holding was limited to the type of class action involved in that
case").
268. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975 (absent plaintiff must be provided with opt-out form).
269. See infra Sections III(A)(3), III(B). One of the more inventive efforts involved an attempt to
invoke subdivision (b)(2), by claiming "mandatory injunctive relief in the form of asbestos abatement"
and restitution for expenses of remedying asbestos hazards. In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D.
422, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1984), affd in part, vacated in part, 789 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d
920 (1986). The court rejected this argument as an effort to transform a claim for damages into an
equitable remedy merely by changing the name. Id. at 438-39.
270. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 24-25; see also In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893-94 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982); cf. I H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 1004 (1977).
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ple made claims to the same property or fund by consolidating them in a
single suit in equity. 71 The class action is an extension of this device.27 2
The 1938 federal class action rule also provides historical support for
mandatory classes, particularly in cases concerning common rights or lim-
ited funds. The rule divided class actions into three categories.273 The
"spurious" class action loosely resembled today's subdivision (b)(3) action
in that it concerned separate claims with common questions. Class mem-
bers were not bound unless they opted in, and this action was permissive
rather than mandatory.274 On the other hand, "true" class actions, which
involved joint or common interests, and "hybrid" actions, which involved
claims against fixed properties or limited funds, generally were treated as
mandatory in effect, although the right to opt out had not yet crystallized
enough to make that terminology meaningful. 75 The categories actually
reflected differences in binding effect, in that members of true classes were
bound by res judicata and hybrid class members were bound to the extent
that their claims concerned the fund before the court.
276
When the federal rule was revised in 1966, the categories of class ac-
tions took their present form. Subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) came to in-
clude most of the actions that would have been called true or hybrid under
the 1938 terminology.27 Although the terminology has now been changed,
suits involving common rights or limited funds-the old true or hybrid
class actions-often present the most appealing situations for mandatory
class joinder today.
278
By definition, it is impossible to resolve separately individual claims
involving common rights or limited funds. One of the best examples is
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs,27 1 in which the Supreme Court con-
cluded that an insurer's contingency fund, composed of contributions from
policyholders, was treated appropriately as a unit, in a single suit in
which all policyholders necessarily were joined. The reason, said the
Court, was that "[tihe Fund was single. . . .It would have been destruc-
tive of [policyholders'] mutual rights . ..to use the Mortuary Fund in
271. J. POMEROY, E_ UTY JumsPRUDENCE §§ 250-55 (1918); Chafee, Bills of Peace with Aful-
tiple Parties, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1932).
272. See authorities cited supra note 270.
273. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 14-15.
274. Id.; see also Miller, Class Action Problem, supra note 6, at 670.
275. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 14-15.
276. Id. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILaER & KANE, supra note 21, § 1752.
277. Id.
278. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
279. 237 U.S. 662 (1915). As Professor Miller has written, "The paradigm Rule 23(b)(1)(B) case
is one in which there are multiple claimants to a limited fund. . . .There is a risk, if litigants are
allowed to proceed on an individual basis, that those who sue first will deplete the fund and leave
nothing for the latecomers." Miller, Federal Class Actions, supra note 6, at 211.
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one way . . . in one State and to use it another way . . . in a different
State."
280
Similarly, compulsory joinder has been justified by necessity in such
contexts as group challenges to reorganization of a fraternal benefit associ-
ation;28' attacks on the proposed merger of two professional athletic
leagues that would reduce the number of player positions;282 group chal-
lenges to a statutory provision regarding Navy re-enlistment bonuses;2"3
and multiple claims regarding declaration of a dividend. 8 4 In each of
these situations, as in the common rights or limited fund cases, a unitary
decision is essential.285 It is impossible to reorganize a single fraternal
benefit organization in inconsistent ways, or to keep two basketball
leagues both merged and separate, or to distribute uniform bonuses ac-
cording to conflicting plans, or simultaneously to pay and withhold a
dividend.
2. Mandatory Classes for Mass Tort Punitive Damage Claims
A more recent use of mandatory classes has been in mass tort cases.
During the last two decades, there has been a vast increase in suits filed to
redress widespread injuries from mass disasters or nationally marketed
products. As one district court has stated, claims concerning certain of
these products have achieved such notoriety "that the mere mention of
their names-Agent Orange, Asbestos, DES, MER/29, Dalkon
Shield-conjure [sic] images of massive litigation" and of claims for "'big
money' punitive damage awards."2 The mandatory class action has been
advanced as a means of dealing efficiently and fairly with claims for puni-
tive damages in these cases.
287
280. lbs, 237 U.S. at 670-71; accord Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin,
305 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1938); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146, 149 (1917); Supreme
Council Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 546 (1915).
281. Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938).
282. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
283. Larionoff v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 140 (D.D.C. 1973), affd and remanded on other
grounds, 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
284. Cf Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951) (shareholder suit to enjoin sale of
unissued stock).
285. See Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla.), affid, 441 F.2d
728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971); Walker v. City of Houston, 341 F. Supp. 1124,
1131-32 (S.D. Tex. 1971); 7A WRIrGrr, MITTFR & KANE, supra note 21, § 1772 (expressing view
that when both subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(3) are possible bases of certification, subdivision (b)(1) may
provide preferable basis).
286. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887,
892 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
287. See, e.g., infra Sections III(A)(3), III(B). Compare, e.g., Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in
Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779 (1985) (urging caution in use of mass tort class
actions) with Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(bXl), 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1143 (1983) (favoring greater use of mass tort class actions).
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Proponents of mandatory classes have suggested several theories for cat-
egorizing massive punitive damages claims under subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 23. First, aggregate damage claims in a mass tort case may exceed a
defendant's net worth. The defendant's assets arguably are then analogous
to a limited fund, so that, in the language of subdivision (b)(1)(B), sepa-
rate suits would "create a risk of. . . adjudications . . which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests" of other class mem-
bers.288 Without a mandatory class, huge damage awards might go to
those few lucky claimants who were first in line at the courthouse, while
others might receive nothing.289 This argument sometimes is referred to as
the "constructive bankruptcy" theory. 9 0
A second argument for mandatory classes in mass tort cases sometimes
is called the "punitive damage overkill theory."29 It assumes that there
must be a limit to aggregate punitive damage recoveries for a single course
of conduct or event, since the function of punitive damages is to provide an
economic deterrent to undesirable conduct.292 A few states in fact do have
specific limits,29 3 while others require a reasonable relationship in amount
between actual and punitive damages. 9 4 The law of other states is ambig-
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). See generally 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 77,
§§ 1783, 1805; Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J.
ENVTL L. 1, 28 (1986); authorities discussed infra Section III(A)(3); cf. Miller, Federal Class Ac-
tions, supra note 6, at 211.
289. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Coburn v. 4-R Corp, 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky.
1977) (Beverly Hills Supper Club fire case) ("In no event . . . should this litigation become an
unseemly race to the courtroom door with monetary prizes for a few winners and worthless judgments
for the rest."), petition for mandamus denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United
States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 913 (1979).
290. E.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 897-98 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
291. In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff d in part, vacated in
part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986). See generally Note, Mass Liability and
Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797, 1800-12 (1979); Putz & Astiz, Punitive Dam-
age Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 18-40
(1981).
Appellants, in Asbestos, argued that the overkill rationale was invalid because (1) trial judges had
procedural devices to guard against overkill, (2) each plaintiff had to prove punitive damages in rela-
tion to himself, and (3) there had to be a relationship between punitive and compensatory damages.
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 1-19, In re Asbestos School Litig. 789 F.2d 996 (3d
Cir.) (argument of Professor Miller), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986).
292. There is apparently no double jeopardy prohibition on repetitive assessments of punitive
damages in civil cases. In the absence of a limit, a defendant may be subjected repeatedly to overlap-
ping penalties in independent actions concerning the same conduct. See authorities cited infra notes
294-95. For a discussion of the purposes of punitive damages, see Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Dam-
ages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 647-50 (1980).
293. For example, some states limit punitive damages by dollar amounts or by percentages of a
defendant's net worth. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(b) (1985) (limiting punitive damages
for most categories of cases to $25,000 or one percent of defendant's net worth, whichever is greater).
294. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sandaval, 442 F. Supp. 491 (D. Colo. 1977); International Bankers Life
Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963) ("[t]he remedy selected in relation to the
actual harm done the plaintiff [is a] proper consideration[] in weighing the amount of an exemplary
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uous, but courts considering the argument generally have been willing to
accept the probability that these states also would impose limits at some
point.295 In the alternative, constitutional doctrines such as the Eighth
Amendment or the due process clause might prohibit excessive or irra-
tional uses of punitive damages.29
Without mandatory classes, widespread opt-out may produce individual
punitive damage adjudications whose aggregate would exceed the appro-
priate limit.297 The defendant therefore faces a risk of "inconsistent stan-
dards" for punitive damage liability. This risk arguably satisfies the re-
quirements of subdivision (b)(1)(A) of Rule 23.298 At the same time,
claimants face the risk that their recoveries of punitive damages may be
prevented by state law or constitutional limits, unless they are among the
fortunate early winners of very large judgments-in short, there is limited
generosity in the punitive damage field. This risk may satisfy subdivision
(b)(1)(B) of the rule. 9
District judges have certified mandatory punitive damage classes in sev-
eral mass tort cases but rejected them in several others. One or more of
these theories has justified the result in each case."' 0 Among the most re-




295. For example, in Skywalk, the district court recognized that a Missouri appellate court had
considered the argument that a defendant could be liable for punitive damages only once on the basis
of any given transaction. 93 F.R.D. at 424 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Parker, 634 S.W.2d 506 (Mo.
App. 1982)).
296. "There must, therefore, be some limit, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of due
process, to the amount of times defendants may be punished for a single transaction." In re "Agent
Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Skywalk, 680 F.2d at
1190 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he Constitution does not create an absolute bar" to
punitive damages).
There are other ways in which punitive damages arguably might be limited. Earlier awards might
be admitted in later claimants' cases as relevant to the quantum of deterrence. Cf Agent Orange, 100
F.R.D. at 728 (noting potential relevance of punitive damages to courts considering subsequent
claims). Specific federal policies might limit punitive damages. Id. at 727-28 (federal policy against
impairing national defense capability could limit punitive damages). Finally, punitive damages may be
limited by creating federal common law. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506,
526-30 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 750 F.2d 1314 (1984).
Several courts have rejected these overkill arguments, holding that multiple awards need not be
limited. E.g., Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3335 (1986); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit avoided the questions in In re Asbestos School Litig.,
789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986). Concerns about the handling of punitive
damages in mass tort and product liability contexts has also generated pressure to create a federal
common law rule on the subject. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.
1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
297. See authorities cited supra notes 293-94.
298. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
299. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
300. See infra Section III(A)(3).
301. The petition for mandamus was denied in Agent Orange. See infra note 334; see also
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3. Mandatory Punitive Damage Classes in Nationwide Product Lia-
bility and Mass Accident Cases: From Skywalk to Dalkon Shield
to Agent Orange
One of the major mandatory punitive damage class cases arose from the
collapse of two skywalks in the lobby of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency
Hotel, which killed 114 persons and injuring at least 212 others.3"2 Ap-
proximately 150 separate federal and state suits resulted.303 In In re Fed-
eral Skywalk Cases,30 4 Judge Scott Wright certified a Rule 23(b)(1)
mandatory class for punitive damages.305
The Skywalk case was of the "mass disaster" genre. When many inju-
ries are traceable to a single incident, almost all liability inquiries, includ-
ing most questions of specific causation, are focused on an event that oc-
curred at a definite time and place.308 As a result, gains in both efficiency
and equity from group resolution may be greater than in other mass tort
cases.
3 0 7
Although Judge Wright also accepted certification arguments that were
not dependent on mass accident reasoning, 30 the single event nature of
Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977), petitionfor mandamus denied sub nom. Union
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed,
443 U.S. 913 (1979); ef. Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1974), affd,
507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1976). Coburn later was questioned, if not repudiated, by the appellate court that had upheld it.
In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 n.12 (6th Cir. 1984).
302. See 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 77, § 1783; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 6
(citing Skywalk, 93 F.R.D. at 419).
303. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 6.
304. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982), rev'd, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir. 1982).
305. 93 F.R.D. at 428. See generally Wright & Colussi, supra note 173, at 150.
306. See also Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certifying class action in
Beverly Hills Supper Club fire case), petition for mandamus denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913
(1979).
307. Actually, the drafters of the 1966 Rules had expressed the concern that personal injury tort
claims might be inappropriate for class resolution because numerous individual issues ordinarily
would overwhelm the common issues. Thus a mass tort class action "would degenerate in practice into
multiple lawsuits separately tried." Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure of the United
States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 103 (1966) (Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(b)(3)).
This qualification, however, expressly was attached only to Rule 23(b)(3) actions. Arguably, subdi-
vision (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions could be distinguished, and a coherence of issues-as might occur in
the mass accident case-then could strengthen the argument for certification. See generally 7B
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 77, § 1783.
One approach to such a case is to inquire whether it is brought together "more by a mutual interest
in the settlement of common questions than it is divided by the individual members' interest in matters
peculiar to them." 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACICE 23.45[21, at 23-324 to -325 (2d ed. 1980).
Certification should then depend upon whether class members are "seeking to remedy a common legal
grievance." Id. at 332.
Another approach, borrowed from the language of pendent jurisdiction, is to ask whether a "com-
mon nucleus of operative facts" can be addressed in a unified adjudication. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER &
KANE, supra note 21, § 1778.
308. Judge Wright accepted the constructive bankruptcy analogy. See Skywalk, 93 F.R.D. at 424.
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the Skywalk case had a clear influence on his certification order. For ex-
ample, it appeared that Missouri law might prevent a single defendant
from becoming liable for more than one punitive damage award for a
single accident.""9 The first claimant to obtain an award then might be the
"first and only winner," and this result supported arguments for a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class.310 Judge Wright also saw a risk of inconsis-
tent adjudications from the defendants' standpoint sufficient to support
subdivision (b)(1)(A) certification.31 1 By unitary adjudication, the court
could avoid "allow[ing] a minority of claimants to take any or all defend-
ants to trial time and time again," with varying outcomes.3 12 "Economy of
effort," as well as "uniformity of result," would follow.
3 13
The Eighth Circuit, without reaching the merits of the certification or-
der, reversed. 3 4 The majority concluded that the mandatory class order
amounted to an injunction against pending state actions prohibited by the
federal Anti-Injunction Act.311 In dissent, Judge Heaney argued that the
certification order did not violate the Act and that the equity and effi-
ciency arguments supported Judge Wright's actions. 8
Shortly before Skywalk, in In re Northern District of California
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation,"" Judge Spencer
Williams had certified a mandatory nationwide punitive damages class
under subdivision (b)(1)(B). 8' The two cases, Skywalk and Dalkon
In addition, the district court concluded that multiple litigation by plaintiffs could be unfair to defend-
ants, id. at 423-24 (citing Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 (S.D. Fla.
1974), affd, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975)) which in turn was based upon the concern that offensive
collateral estoppel might apply. But see In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 (6th
Cir. 1984) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)). The Skywalk district court
further concluded that a mandatory class would reduce unethical conflicts of interest on the part of
attorneys representing multiple claimants. 93 F.R.D. at 425.
309. 93 F.R.D. at 424.
310. 93 F.R.D. at 425.
311. Id. at 423-24.
312. Id. at 423.
313. Id. at 424.
314. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
315. Id. at 1180-83. The court reasoned that the district court's prohibition on settlement of
punitive claims was an injunction against state proceedings and that, in addition, the "substantial
effect" of the district court's order "enjoined" ongoing state compensatory and punitive damage litiga-
tion. Id. at 1180. But cf. supra note 175 (discussing exception to federal anti-injunction statute).
The majority did not decide the mandatory class question, but its opinion can be read as accepting
the viability of mass tort mandatory classes. 680 F.2d at 1182-84 (describing characteristics of appro-
priate injunctions in mandatory class cases, commending judge's efforts, and recognizing that several
commentators support use of class actions in mass accident litigation).
316. Id. at 1184-93.
317. 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order), 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (opinion),
vacated, 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). See generally 7B
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 77, § 1805; Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going,
Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 332-36 (1983).
318. 526 F. Supp. at 893-900. The court also certified a statewide Rule 23(b)(3) class action on
compensatory damages. Id. at 900-03.
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Shield, involved many similar arguments. But Dalkon Shield differed
from Skywalk in certain important respects. Rather than a mass disaster
occurring at a definite time and place, Dalkon Shield concerned allega-
tions that a nationally distributed product had injured each claimant at a
different time and place.31 9 Different plaintiffs claimed different kinds of
injuries, ranging from uterine perforations, infections, and hysterectomies
to spontaneous abortion, fetal injuries, and pregnancy. 2 The virtually
complete commonality of liability issues in Skywalk thus was lacking in
the nationwide product liability claims of Dalkon Shield . 21 The case for
certification correspondingly was weaker.
3 22
Nevertheless, Judge Williams certified the mandatory class on the basis
of the constructive bankruptcy theory. He concluded that nationwide pu-
nitive damage claims, which totalled more than $2.3 billion, exceeded the
$280 million net worth of the principal defendant, A. H. Robins Com-
pany.323 He also concluded that the overkill justification was present be-
cause punitive damages "certainly" would be subject to limits "implied in
law."'3 24 Judge Williams' certification in Dalkon Shield thus rested upon
equity and efficiency reasons analogous to those given by Judge Wright in
Skywalk.
The Ninth Circuit reversed.3 25 It found insufficient commonality in
claims depending on widely differing facts and arising under the laws of
fifty jurisdictions that "do not apply the same punitive damages stan-
dards. '3 26 Furthermore, since no plaintiff sought certification and no at-
torney already involved in the case was willing to serve as class counsel,
the court found typicality and adequacy of representation to be
deficient.
3 27
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the reasoning at the heart of mandatory
class certification in Dalkon Shield. Rule 23(b)(1)(B), it said, could not be
used in a mass tort case unless the record established that early awards
"inescapably" would affect later awards; a mere "risk" of that result, even
319. Id. at 892-93.
320. Id.
321. In particular, causation issues varied with the individual and with the type of injury. Fur-
thermore, issues regarding defectiveness or adequacy of warning could have been affected by different
state of the art considerations (and similarly punitive damages could be affected by differences in
defendants' knowledge of risk), since usage of the product took place over roughly a five-year span.
Id. The case also presented issues of liability of other persons, such as physicians, that would depend
upon different facts in each case.
322. See supra note 307. Judge Williams recognized the distinction, but his analysis found suffi-
cient commonality for certification.
323. 526 F. Supp. at 897.
324. Id. at 898.
325. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
326. 693 F.2d at 850.
327. Id. at 850-51.
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though it satisfied the literal terms of the rule, was not enough.32
"[W]ithout more," said the court, "numerous plaintiffs and a large ad
damnum should [not] guarantee (b)(1)(B) certification." 29Since there was
no showing that punitive recoveries "inescapably" would exceed the de-
fendant's net worth, the constructive bankruptcy argument failed.3 0 As
for the "punitive damages overkill" theory, although recognizing that
there might be situations in which a court should "protect a defendant
from unreasonable punitive damages," the court merely asserted, crypti-
cally, that a class action "is not the only way" to accomplish that result.3 31
The one recent case.. 2 in which an appellate court has upheld a
mandatory class3 3 3 is In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga-
tion.334 Plaintiffs, Vietnam War veterans and members of their families,
claimed to have suffered damages as a result of the veterans' exposure to
herbicides allegedly produced by the defendants.'3  Agent Orange superfi-
cially resembled the dispersed product tort case, such as Dalkon Shield,
rather than the mass disaster typified by Skywalk. Differences in exposure
328. Id. at 851 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976)).
The court distinguished Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir.
1976), in which it had indicated that subdivision (b)(1)(B) certification could apply if the claims
exceeded defendant's assets, on the ground that it "was a 10b-5 [securities] action and did not involve
mass personal injury claims." 693 F.2d at 851. Since a securities action could turn upon a single
course of allegedly fraudulent or misleading conduct, and damages could be liquidated, the distinction
may be valid.
329. 693 F.2d at 852 (quoting Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979)).
330. Id. at 851.
331. Id. at 852.
332. After Skywalk and Dalkon Shield, in In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239
(S.D. Ohio 1984), Judge Carl Rubin certified a mandatory class for settlement purposes under the
asserted authority of both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(1)(B). In addition to efficiency concerns,
Judge Rubin felt that the defendant's exposure to inconsistent adjudications and the risk that defend-
ant's assets might be a limited fund that would not satisfy all claims warranted certification. 102
F.R.D. at 241. The Sixth Circuit granted mandamus and reversed the certification. In re Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
Bendectin, in which pregnant women asserted claims alleged to have resulted from a morning sick-
ness drug, presented varying issues of liability that included individualized causation questions. See id.
at 301-02. It more closely resembled the dispersed product torts claimed in Dalkon Shield than the
mass disaster of Skywalk. The Sixth Circuit held that the risk of varying adjudications required by
subdivision (b)(1)(A) was not satisfied merely because some plaintiffs might be successful while others
might not. Id. at 305. Any resulting variation might not be inconsistent at all, because it might reflect
factual differences in individual cases. Nor was the constructive bankruptcy determination supported
by proof. Id. at 306; see also Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories, 99 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D.N.H. 1983)
(mem.) (denying certification in DES mass tort case).
333. Not only had Skywalk, Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin-the recent major mandatory class
certifications-all been reversed, but the rationales of earlier certifications that had survived review,
such as Coburn, had been undermined. See supra note 301.
334. 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), petition for writ of mandamus denied sub nom. In re
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
335. 100 F.R.D. at 720.
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levels and other aspects of causation ostensibly made each individual's
claim distinct and, therefore, inappropriate for class resolution.336
Judge Jack Weinstein, however, did not accept the analogy to the dis-
persed product tort cases. He concluded, instead, that "[u]nlike litigations
such as those involving DES, Dalkon Shield and asbestos, the [Agent Or-
ange] trial is likely to emphasize critical common defenses applicable to
the plaintiffs' class as a whole. 337 These defenses included "general," as
opposed to individual, causation, because the defendants' theory was that
their herbicides "could not have caused [any of] the injuries claimed." 338
Furthermore, the "government contractor" defense, or the assertion that
defendants were not liable because the government had prescribed the
specifications for the product for defense purposes, was "inextricably in-
terwoven" with the causation issues. 3 ' Finally, Judge Weinstein said that
the "extraordinary size" and "posture" of the case, including its place in
the "real world" of dispute settlement, enhanced the need to resolve the
general causation issue on a classwide basis.340 Judge Weinstein's opinion
thus stressed the unique nature of the dispute and persuasively compared
it to the Skywalk mass disaster model for which tort class actions presuma-
bly were more appropriate.
With respect to the constructive bankruptcy theory, Judge Weinstein
pointed out that courts had disagreed over the magnitude of the risk that
was required to justify Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. 34 ' The Ninth Cir-
cuit's stringent demand in Dalkon Shield, that impairment of claims must
be "inescapable," seemed inconsistent with Rule 23, which required only
a "risk" of impairment." 2 On the other hand, some courts apparently had
concluded that the mere existence of some degree of risk was enough;
Judge Weinstein found this standard too lax. 43
Ultimately, Judge Weinstein approached the issue by balancing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of certification. He saw the disadvantages of
claims impairment in Agent Orange as significant, since it would mean
that tens of thousands of veterans and their families would be without
means to collect on a judgment." Judge Weinstein therefore concluded
that a standard of "substantial probability" was appropriate. 3 5 By com-
336. Id. at 722.




341. Id. at 726.
342. Id.; see supra note 328 and accompanying text.
343. 100 F.R.D. at 726 (citing Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977)).
344. 100 F.R.D. at 726.
345. Judge Weinstein supported this test of less than preponderance but more than mere possibil-
ity by reference to similar standards in other procedural contexts. Id. at 726-27.
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paring evidence of the defendants' financial position with the claims in the
case, however, he concluded that factual proof of the requisite substantial
probability was lacking.
3,46
Judge Weinstein's mandatory class certification in Agent Orange in-
stead was based on the punitive damages overkill theory. There must be
"some limit," either as a matter of policy or as a matter of due process, to
the amount a defendant can be punished for a single transaction, said the
judge.347 Again, he stressed the uniqueness of the case, pointing out that it
presented a special policy consideration against "substantial" punitive
damages, since they might discourage future defense contractors and
thereby impair the national government's ability to formulate policy under
its war powers. 348 The probability of a limited fund of punitive damages
thus was enhanced. The only available means for equitably distributing
this fund to claimants, Judge Weinstein concluded, was a subdivision
(b)(1)(B) mandatory class.
3 49
The Agent Orange defendants sought mandamus. The Second Circuit
denied the writ, stressing the uniqueness of the case, the commonality of
issues, the significant economies of a class action, and the need for unitary
disposition of the potential limited fund of punitive damages.38 0 The dis-
trict judge's forceful opinion had succeeded in upholding mandatory certi-
fication when the superficial aspects of the case seemed against it, but
when the need appeared great.
B. Mandatory Certification After Shutts: The Asbestos Example
Agent Orange was the only recent mandatory certification before Shutts
to withstand appellate review. The first post-Shutts mandatory class opin-
ion was not long in coming. In In re Asbestos School Litigation,351 Judge
346. Id.
347. Id. at 728.
348. Id. at 727-28.
349. Id. at 728.
350. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
Although the appeal challenges various aspects of the settlement, Judge Weinstein's certification does
not appear to be in jeopardy.
351. 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff d in part, vacated in part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.),
vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986). See generally Byer, National Mandatory Class Actions: Key Questions
Remain Unanswered, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 19, col. 1.
There have been at least three mandatory certifications since Shutts, but they have tended not to
focus on monetary recovery. In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 107 F.R.D. 703 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating to prison lockdown policy; court noted that
monetary claims were less significant than claims for injunctive relief); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 748, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of action
for declaratory and injunctive relief). However, in In re Fernald Litig., No. C-1-85-0149 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 8, 1986), a class was certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) seeking damages for property damages
and emotional distress, as well as clean-up efforts flowing from uranium leakages over a considerable
period of time.
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James McGirr Kelly considered whether Shutts affected mandatory clas-
ses and held that it did not.
The proposed class in Asbestos consisted of school districts throughout
the nation seeking relief for the removal of asbestos coating from school
buildings.352 Certain plaintiffs sought nationwide mandatory class certifi-
cation and three major asbestos-producing defendants cooperated with
their request. Another group of school boards, however, opposed
mandatory class certification and supported a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out ac-
tion. Finally, a group of defendants opposed certification of any class,
whether mandatory or opt-out3 53 In an order issued before Shutts and
under unusually controversial circumstances, Judge Kelly certified a
mandatory nationwide class for punitive damages. 54 He also enjoined the
filing of new actions as well as further prosecution of many cases pending
throughout the nation. 55
The Asbestos district court did not rely upon the constructive bank-
ruptcy justification for mandatory certification because proponents did not
support it with evidence. 56 The certification, as in Agent Orange, instead
was based on the "punitive damages overkill" theory. Judge Kelly
adopted the substantial probability analysis of Agent Orange and found it
satisfied by the likelihood that awards to early prevailing school districts
would impair those to later districts. 5"
The decision in Shutts led Judge Kelly to reconsider the mandatory
class. He recognized that Shutts required, as a condition of due process,
that an unaffiliated class member "at a minimum . . . be provided with
an opportunity to remove himself from the class," but he did not consider
352. 104 F.R.D. at 424-26.
353. Id. at 426-27 (setting out postures of the four groups). Professor Miller represented the
Barnwell School District of South Carolina, the principal representative of the group opposing
mandatory certification but supporting a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class. Id. at n.5.
354. The pro-certification plaintiffs filed their initial class motion on March 30, 1984. Later, they
moved for "immediate" mandatory certification as to three large defendants. These three defendants
promptly agreed not to oppose a nationwide mandatory class. Thereafter, the district court also acted
promptly in entering a certification order. Only two weeks elapsed between the initial pleading, and
the certification of the mandatory class on April 13, 1984. Id. at 426.
355. Id. Other courts generally regarded this feature of the order as invalid and proceeded with
the cases before them, precipitating unseemly conflicts. See, e.g., Spartanburg County School Dist.
Seven v. National Gypsum Co., No. 83 Civ. 1744-14 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 1985) (refusing to obey injunc-
tion); County of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., No. Civ.-2-83-262 (E.D. Tenn. April 13,
1985) (denying motion to stay based upon injunction); Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States
Gypsum Co., No. B-81-277CA (E.D. Tex. May 11, 1984) (enjoining defendants from taking action
to deprive court of jurisdiction); Richland County School Dist. One v. W.R. Grace Co., No. 82 Civ.
CP-403050.1 (S.C. Cir. Ct. June 5, 1984) (ordering parties to continue pre-trial preparation despite
injunction).
356. 104 F.R.D. at 434 n.15.
357. Id. at 434-36. Judge Kelly's opinion also referred to the standard as requiring a "substantial
possibility." Id. at 437.
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this language controlling.35 Instead, Judge Kelly emphasized language in
footnote 3 of the Supreme Court's opinion, limiting the holding to tradi-
tional class actions for "money judgments."359
Although punitive damages might call for a "money judgment," and
although they are an "ancient legal remedy," the district court considered
them similar to equitable relief.360 Much as do criminal fines, claims for
punitive damages, Judge Kelly reasoned, seek to provide for the public
good, rather than for compensation.36' Furthermore, the Asbestos district
court concluded that due process arguments actually supported the
mandatory class, since due process required punitive recoveries to be dis-
tributed fairly among all claimants.36 2 Finally, although plaintiffs' claims
would be the focus of a suit for compensatory damages, the Asbestos dis-
trict court saw punishing the defendant as the true object of punitive dam-
age actions. The court therefore concluded that less protection was appro-
priate for punitive damage claimants' right to opt out." 3
The Third Circuit reversed the certification of a mandatory punitive
damage class in Asbestos on the ground that "neither the record nor the
court's findings are adequate to support the procedure."' " Because there
were no factual findings "as to the potential amount and scope of punitive
damages," the appellate court concluded that the district court's certifica-
tion was an abuse of discretion. 6 5 By disposing of the case on that basis,
the Third Circuit was able to avoid deciding any of the questions that
Shutts presented. The court did "hold open the possibility," however, of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class "in more appropriate circum-
stances." '66 Therefore, Shutts itself remains the only appellate decision
relevant to the issue.
358. In re Asbestos School Litig., 620 F. Supp. 873, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
359. Id. (citing Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975) ("We intimate no view concerning other types of class
action lawsuits, such as those seeking equitable relief.").
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 877.
363. Id. at 876-77.
364. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986).
365. Id. The court buttressed its conclusion by saying that because the class only embraced some
of the property damage claimants, and none of the personal injury plaintiffs, numerous other punitive
damage actions would go forward, making Judge Kelly's Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory school board
class "under-inclusive" and potentially prejudicial to its members. Finally, the court expressed con-
cern about respecting the various state laws relating to punitive damages, noting that "the dictates of
state law may not be buried under the vast expanse of a federal class action." Id. at 1007.
366. Id. at 1008. The court did not indicate, however, whether such a class could be mandatory.
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C. Mandatory Class Actions After Shutts: A Policy Analysis
There is no neat and logical means of resolving the question whether
mandatory actions survive Shutts. 67 The answer depends upon the view
one takes of Shutts itself and of the need for mandatory classes. It also
depends upon the characteristics of the particular class action.
1. Shutts as a Case Concerned with the Evils of Distant Forum
Abuse
One way to view Shutts is as a case about distant forum abuse. The
right to opt out is essential to the Supreme Court's inference of consent,
and that reasoning, in turn, is essential to the Court's validation of juris-
diction over members who have no affiliation with a distant forum."8' If
this reasoning is accepted, Shutts does not abolish all mandatory classes.
Instead, it prohibits only those mandatory actions that are brought in in-
appropriate forums.
This conclusion can be tested by considering the viewpoint of the class
member. Mandatory certification does violence to the class member's right
to opt out. But the forum can deny that right and force a class member to
litigate in the action if that member or the object of the action has suffi-
cient contacts with the forum,""9 just as it could join her involuntarily if
she were a defendant.
Thus, if this distant forum abuse reasoning is an accurate reflection of
the Shutts holding, whether a mandatory class action is maintainable de-
pends upon whether there are sufficient contacts between the claimants
(or the object of the action) and the forum. For example, a case concern-
ing a limited fund located in a particular state can be brought as a
mandatory action, because the nexus between the fund, the claimants, and
the action supports the exercise of jurisdiction over claimants even against
their will.370 On the other hand, an action brought in a forum lacking the
required relationship to the claimants or the object of the action cannot be
made mandatory.
This approach also can be applied to mandatory punitive damage clas-
ses. A unified mass disaster, such as that in Skywalk, probably has the
requisite nexus to support mandatory certification at the site of the disas-
ter. Arguably, all of the putative claimants in Skywalk (or their decedents)
367. Cf Byer, supra note 351, at 21, 25 (Shutts is "ambiguous with respect to mandatory class
actions;" questions "will persist until the . . . Supreme Court finally answers them").
368. See supra Section II(A)(1).
369. This holding is implicit in the common rights and limited fund class cases. See supra notes
279-85 and accompanying text.
370. See supra Section II(A)(1); ef. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (applying Inter-
national Shoe test to in rem jurisdiction).
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purposefully had availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties in Missouri.37 1 This analysis would be more difficult in other mass
disaster cases; for example, it is harder to maintain that transcontinental
air passengers purposefully have availed themselves of a forum by crash-
ing into it.372 Even in those cases, however, it is arguable that the nexus is
enough to overcome claims of distant forum abuse,373 despite the fact that
the classic International Shoe-Denckla-Woodson criteria have not been
met, as they would have to be in asserting jurisdiction over defendants.
A distant forum abuse analysis would not support mandatory actions in
most nationwide product liability actions or claims for other dispersed
torts. In Asbestos, for example, the court, which was located in Pennsylva-
nia, lacked the requisite relationship to claims by school districts in
Omaha or Los Angeles for damages from installations in their buildings.
Conversely, these school districts would have legitimate reason to view the
assertion of jurisdiction by a Philadelphia federal court as distant forum
abuse.3 74 The same result follows in cases such as Dalkon Shield.
This analysis, however, cannot explain the result in Agent Orange,
which suggests that there can be equity and efficiency factors so compel-
ling as to overcome distant forum abuse concerns.37 5 If this conclusion is
correct, the requirement of a nexus between the forum and the claims
371. See supra notes 219-20, 306-13, and accompanying text.
372. See Note, Mechanical Problems, supra note 264, at 545.
373. Several lines of reasoning support this conclusion. First, the case is one of specific rather
than general jurisdiction, in that the claims would "arise out of or relate to" the contacts with the
jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1985) (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). Therefore, jurisdiction could be
sustained on less substantial contacts than otherwise would be required. Second, in-hand service on
overflying aircraft has been upheld by at least one court. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442
(E.D. Ark. 1959). Third, the common right and limited fund cases concern instances in which the
class members' relationship to the jurisdiction may be viewed as equally attenuated, but jurisdiction
has been upheld. See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text. Finally, in class actions, even
courts applying the minimum contact standard have tended to construe it liberally in favor of jurisdic-
tion (although this rationale may be questionable). See Note, National Classes, supra note 264, at
1503; Katz v. NVF Co., 119 Misc. 2d 48, 462 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1983), rev'd, 100 A.D.2d 470,
473 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1984).
However, there could be variations in the litigation that would raise more serious questions. The
recent crash in Newfoundland of an Arrow Airlines flight carrying United States servicemen re-
turning from an overseas mission is an example. Whether a mandatory class could be certified in a
place within the United States-at the point of destination, for example-is problematic.
374. In particular, they may have a strong interest in presenting their claims in their own state
before local citizens, where the damage is alleged to have occurred.
375. The authority of the court in a case like Agent Orange to make class inclusion mandatory, if
it exists, may be a manifestation of the elusive doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity. Cf Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950) (interest of the state in provision
of forum for settling trust accounts is separate basis for jurisdiction, not depending upon in personam-
in rem distinction); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.13
(1984) (declining to adopt "potentially far-reaching modification of existing law" implicit in jurisdic-
tion by necessity).
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cannot be a talisman to solve every case. Instead, it becomes only one
important factor to be weighed in the balance.
2. Shutts as a Decision Protecting the Claimant's Interest in
Individual Control of Litigation
Another way to analyze Shutts is as a decision protecting the right to
opt out for its own sake. In this view, the right to opt out not only is a
check against distant forum abuse, but it also protects the claimant's right
to control her litigation.
If this analysis were asserted to its logical extreme, it would prohibit
mandatory class certification completely. That result seems to be sup-
ported by the unconditional statement of the right to opt out in Shutts.37 6
In tort cases, it also may be supported by a policy that regards individual
control of personal injury claims as particularly important.
3
7
The difficulty with this absolute approach, however, is that it prevents
rational adjudication of genuine Rule 23(b)(1) class claims which, by defi-
nition, require unified disposition. The common fund issues in Hartford
Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs,378  for example, could not have been decided
differently in individual suits without destruction of the policyholders'
mutual rights. The same could be said of limited fund cases generally, as
well as disputes involving common rights that have arisen in cases involv-
ing such diverse entities as professional sports leagues and military bonus
programs.37 9 If individual adjudication truly would be impossible, and the
case must be adjudicated uniformly, it seems unlikely that Shutts is in-
tended to prevent that resolution.38 0
376. The Court stated that an opt-out form is required "at a minimum." 105 S. Ct. at 2975. The
Court also required that the absent class member receive "an opportunity to be heard and participate
in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel." Id.; see also supra note 50 (describing ap-
proved opt-out form).
377. Cf supra note 307 (citing Rules Advisory Committee Note). Although it expresses efficiency
concerns, the Note tacitly recognizes that plaintiffs' attorneys are likely to be insistent upon individual
control in such cases. See also Trangsrud, supra note 287, at 820 (emphasizing the "psychological
and emotional importance of individually vindicating [one's] rights against the responsible parties" in
cases of severe personal injury).
378. 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
379. See supra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
380. Cf supra note 375 (jurisdiction by necessity). In addition, Shutts adopts certain commenta-
tors' theory that "a class action resembles a 'quasi-administrative proceeding, conducted by the
judge.'" 105 S. Ct. at 2974 (quoting 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 1
23.45[4.5] (1984)). This model tends to support mandatory classes, since administrative proceedings
can decide rights of non-parties who cannot opt to avoid that effect. Further support for mandatory
classes, and authority for limiting the individual control model of litigation, can be found in cases
allowing collateral estoppel of non-parties. E.g., Cauefield v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 247 F. Supp.
851 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); Southwest
Airlines v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1979); cf
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968) ("[Ilt might be
argued that [a non-party] should be bound by the previous decision because ... he had purposely
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Furthermore, if individual control really is not feasible or is so hope-
lessly inefficient that it could not mean success for any claims, the interest
in that control is diminished considerably. In Agent Orange, for example,
the unique complexity of the common issues made it unlikely that ade-
quate resources could have been marshalled for individual claims."' Like-
wise, if constructive bankruptcy or overkill theories truly support treat-
ment of potential recoveries as a limited fund, mandatory classes may be
justified by the same equity concerns that support the result in Ibs. On the
other hand, it seems correct to conclude, as Judge Weinstein did in Agent
Orange, that a substantial probability, and not merely a generalized no-
tion of "risk" of inconsistency, should be required. 82 The interest in indi-
vidual control, as well as the policy against distant forum abuse, thus sup-
port the denial of mandatory class certification in nationwide tort cases
such as Dalkon Shield and Asbestos.
3. Weighing the Four Factors For and Against Mandatory Classes:
Efficiency, Equity, Distant Forum Abuse, and Individual Control
The reasoning advanced thus far enables us to propose a four-factor
analysis for determining the propriety of mandatory class certification af-
ter Shutts. These four factors reflect policies favoring mandatory classes as
well as policies against them. The theory is speculative. Its uncertainty is
due to the absence of direct analysis of mandatory classes in Shutts.
The principal factors to be considered include the (1) efficiency and
(2) equity concerns that are well illustrated in the pre-Shutts mandatory
class decisions,38 as well as (3) the concern about distant forum abuse
and (4) the interest in individualized control 8 that seem to underlie
bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene. We do not now decide whether such an argument
would be correct under the circumstances of this case."). But cf Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (litigants "who never appeared . . . may not be
collaterally estopped . . . .despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which
stand squarely against their position").
381. See 506 F. Supp. at 790 (noting that "it is doubtful if a single plaintiff represented by a
single attorney pursuing an individual action could ever succeed").
382. See supra notes 341-46.
383. By efficiency, we refer not to the general concept of economic efficiency, but to the economies
of scale that can be achieved in a class action with cohesive issues. Cf supra text accompanying note
307 (discussing efficiencies of class action).
By equity, we refer to the several issues that underlie the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1)(A)
and (b)(1)(B): whether some plaintiffs will be harmed unfairly if other plaintiffs litigate first and
whether defendants may be subjected to multiple (or otherwise inconsistent) liability. In mass tort
cases, for example, these concerns are to be found in the constructive bankruptcy and punitive damage
overkill theories. See supra notes 288-99 and accompanying text.
Efficiency and equity are independent variables. A given certification may be supported by one but
not the other. For example, a class action for compensatory damages that does not threaten construc-
tive bankruptcy could be supported by concerns of efficiency but probably not by those of equity.
384. Cf Wright & Colussi, supra note 173, at 144-47 (discussing Skywalk); Williams, supra
note 317, at 329-30 (discussing right to individualized control).
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Shutts."8 5 Our theory is that the propriety of mandatory class certification
can best be determined by weighing the four enumerated policy factors in
the context of each action.
For example, a highly complex case involving a severely limited com-
mon fund, brought at the fund's situs, would provide a strong argument
for mandatory certification. Both efficiency and equity concerns would
support that result, and since the forum is appropriate and individual con-
trol is not valuable in a highly complex case with small potential recovery
for individual class members, these counterweights would not oppose a
mandatory class. A slightly less compelling, but still persuasive case is
presented by the simpler common or limited fund case, such as Ibs,386
brought at the fund's situs. In that context, efficiency concerns may not be
sufficient to overcome interests in individual control, but equity concerns
are particularly important because the case cannot be adjudicated effec-
tively in separate suits, and the forum has jurisdiction.
For different reasons, cases such as Skywalk and Agent Orange also
may present sound claims for mandatory certification. In Skywalk, the ef-
ficiency and equity factors are present and forum abuse is absent.3 17 In
Agent Orange, the efficiency and equity factors arguably are strong
enough to overcome the distant forum factor, and the interest in individual
control is reduced by the size of the litigation and complexity of the com-
mon issues.3 8 ' On the other hand, the dispersed tort action, such as
Dalkon Shield, presents the weakest claim for mandatory class certifica-
tion, particularly if the constructive bankruptcy and punitive damage
overkill theories are supported only by a generalized risk of inconsis-
tency.38 9 Neither efficiency nor equity factors are persuasive in such a
case.390 Furthermore, the factors of distant forum abuse and interest in
individual control provide significant counterweights.
Although the four-factor analysis thus appears to give sound results in
a wide variety of cases, the theory is supported only by the broadest infer-
ences from Shutts. Mandatory classes are likely to remain as controversial
as they are important. Unless Congress resolves the matter by statute, the
385. For example, conflicts are reduced if all plaintiffs are treated equally. Comity concerns are
reduced if there is no forum abuse and if the interest in individualized control is given appropriate
weight. Other factors have been suggested elsewhere, ranging from the reduction of attorneys' conflicts
of interest to the preservation of comity between courts in different states, but these subsidiary consid-
erations seem to be consequences of the four major factors.
386. See supra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 302-16 and accompanying text.
388. In Agent Orange, the district court used the mandatory class to exercise jurisdiction over
nonconsenting claimants having no contacts with the forum. Arguably, this result would require rec-
ognition of the unusual doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity. See supra note 375.
389. See supra notes 317-31 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 383. Efficiency arguments, however, could be persuasive if clearcut common
questions predominated and other issues were dealt with in bifurcated proceedings.
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Supreme Court someday may need to address the fascinating and knotty
questions it has left open in Shutts.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AFTER SHUYTS
The jurisdictional holding in Shutts means that attorneys for a multi-
state class generally can file suit in whichever state they choose. As Shutts
demonstrates, there may be few claimants residing in the forum."' In-
deed, under the logic of Shutts, a forum having literally no connection
with the suit may still decide it. Like the tail wagging the dog, a state
with an insubstantial interest in the dispute can bind the nation. These
circumstances call for limits on the choice of law to prevent forum shop-
ping, unfairness to defendants, and interference with other states'
sovereignty.
A. Forum Shopping: The Issue of the "Magnet" Forum
The Kansas Supreme Court's essential choice of law holding in Shutts
was that "the law of the forum should be applied unless compelling rea-
sons exist for applying a different law."3 92 As the Kansas court itself ap-
peared to recognize,393 this holding created the danger that resort to
"magnet" forums might defeat the chosen substantive policy of other
states.3 94 If all states adopted a similar approach, plaintiffs' attorney
would be able to identify a "best" plaintiffs' forum in any class action.
This "magnet" jurisdiction would be the state most likely to hold against
the defendant or to award maximum damages. That forum might ignore
laws of other states that would produce a defendant's judgment or a lower
recovery.
Indeed, royalty class actions provide striking empirical evidence that the
magnet forum phenomenon already has developed. There are reported ap-
pellate decisions in at least eight Kansas class actions similar to Shutts,3 95
391. See supra text accompanying note 88.
392. 235 Kan. at 221, 679 P.2d at 1181.
393. "[Tlhis opinion should not be read as an invitation to file nationwide class action suits in
Kansas and overburden our court system." 235 Kan. at 209, 679 P.2d at 1173 (quoting Shutts I, 222
Kan. at 557, 567 P.2d at 1292).
394. Cf Kennedy, supra note 1, at 286 ("The Court thus stripped the defendant Phillips of any
due process protections against the class lawyer who is free . . . to bring the action in the most
favorable state forum without any limitations as to where the claims arose."). This magnet forum
argument was not incorporated in the Court's opinion. However, it was discussed in the briefing and
argument. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 39-40; Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal
Foundation of America, supra note 71, at 14-17. The last question asked by the Court at oral argu-
ment was posed by the Chief Justice, who gave the example of the historical role of Nevada in
migratory divorce cases and inquired of Phillips' counsel whether the choice of law principle adopted
by Kansas would lead to similar kinds of forum shopping.
395. Nix v. Northern Natural Gas Producing Co., 222 Kan. 739, 567 P.2d 1322 (1977); Sterling
v. Superior Oil Co., 222 Kan. 737, 567 P.2d 1325 (1977); Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222 Kan. 733,
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and its courts have entertained others.' 8" No other state has a reported
class action decision concerning interest on suspended royalties. 9 '
Shutts also illustrates the manner in which the Kansas court's reason-
ing would have frustrated regulatory choices made in the administrative
agencies, legislatures, and courts of other states. Both Texas and
Oklahoma had strong interests in the relationship between oil and gas
producers and royalty owners within their borders. Both regarded the
ability to suspend royalty payment as important, 98 since loss of the lease
could follow even inadvertent underpayment. To these states, the Kansas
approach might seem calculated to discourage oil and gas production.'"
Furthermore, the result was that Kansas imposed higher energy costs on
other states, in order to benefit a class of people that included its citi-
zens. 400 In doing so, Kansas declined to consider the applicable statutes,
decisions, and in one instance, the constitution, of other states.40'
It is not a question of whether Kansas, Oklahoma, or Texas law is
"better" in these respects. Kansas has the constitutional authority to deter-
567 P.2d 1326 (1977); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977); Helmley v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 1 Kan. App. 2d 532, 571 P.2d 345 (1977); Gray v. Amoco Prod. Co., 1 Kan. App.
2d 338, 564 P.2d 579 (1977), modified, 223 Kan. 441, 573 "P.2d 1080 (1978).
396. See, e.g., Dudley v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 5188 (Dist. Ct. Stevens County, Kan. 1986). As a
general proposition, more cases appear in the trial courts than in the appellate courts.
397. The only class actions for interest on royalties against Phillips outside Kansas were both
brought in Oklahoma by parties related to the Shutts case, and both were dismissed. The first was
brought by the senior partner of one of Shutts' counsel. The second was brought by two individuals
who moved for dismissal when they joined as representative parties in the Shutts complaint. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 40 n.38.
398. Both Oklahoma and Texas have well-developed law on suspension of royalty payments. See
supra note 67.
399. For example, Kansas is one of a very few jurisdictions that have enacted intrastate price
controls lower than those that would be administered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 417 (1983). Kansas
has interpreted its law together with federal law so as to abrogate agreed pricing terms on gas sold
within Kansas. Compare Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631, 629 P.2d
190, reh'g denied, 230 Kan. 166, 630 P.2d 1129 (1981) (contract price not escalated under clause
incorporating federal regulatory ceilings) with Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981)
(affirming contrary conclusion by FERC). FERC so disagreed with the Mesa result that it took the
unusual step of urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, even though it was not a party to the
action. Brief for the United States and Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n as Amicus Curiae, Mesa
Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 455 U.S. 928 (1982) (No. 81-711) (denying cert.); see
also supra note 67-68.
400. The result of its decisions, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, was not to lower
energy prices in Kansas, but to increase amounts paid upon Kansas leases, which produced gas sold in
interstate as well as intrastate commerce.
401. See supra note 66. Professor Kennedy, however, makes the following observations: "In con-
trast to the majority's casual survey. . . Justice Stevens' prodigious efforts tend to convince the reader
that this case really is one of false conflicts, that he is right that Kansas did in fact apply the law of
Oklahoma and Texas. . . . Ultimately, however, Justice Stevens reveals that his dissent is peculiarly
a function of his minimalist philosophy of. . . conflict of law challenges. One therefore hesitates to
rush to agree that his view of Oklahoma and Texas law has been as neutral as he claims the major-
ity's has been biased." Kennedy, supra note 1, at 302-03.
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mine its policy, or even to act as a maverick jurisdiction, 0 2 in oil and gas
matters that are properly subject to the application of its law. There have
been instances when minority views ultimately have emerged as persua-
sive and have improved the common law.403 But the difficulty with Kan-
sas' choice of law approach is clear: It inevitably defeated other states'
policies .404
Furthermore, if the Kansas approach were adopted throughout the na-
tion, it might create magnet forums for class actions of every kind. Dili-
gent plaintiffs' counsel would feel obligated to choose the state most recep-
tive to their clients' claims. These magnet states would resolve
controversial issues on a nationwide basis.40 5
B. The Constitutional Standards and the Forum's Room for Choice
Shutts addresses these issues by invoking the restrictions on choice of
law contained in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague °.40  These limits, how-
ever, remain only generally defined °.40  For example, Allstate actually up-
held the application of Minnesota law, even though that state arguably
had far less interest in the dispute than Wisconsin.40 8 For the Allstate
plurality, the choice of law would be unconstitutional when the state
whose laws were chosen lacked a "significant contact or significant aggre-
gation of contacts, creating state interests such that choice of its law was
402. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America, supra note 71, at 15-16
("Kansas, in fact, is a maverick jurisdiction in oil and gas matters, probably because a portion of the
State produces oil and gas but a larger and politically more powerful segment does not") (footnote
omitted).
403. For example, the doctrines of comparative negligence and products liability emerged from
minority views that began as exceptions to virtually universal contrary rules. See W. PRossER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 67, 477-79 (5th ed. 1984).
404. The effect would be similar to that condemned in the famous case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie Court emphasized the frustration of state policy resulting from substi-
tution of law preferred by the forum. As an example, it cited Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a federal court nullified a state anti-monopoly
policy by substitution of a "general" rule to the contrary. 304 U.S. at 73-74.
405. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 39. The result, said petitioner, would be to "balkanize
numerous areas of substantive law." Id. at 45.
406. 449 U.S. 302 (1981); see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
407. The Court's holding in Shutts was that the Kansas court's choice of law was "sufficiently
arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits." 105 S. Ct. at 2980. See generally Weintraub,
Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?, 10 HosTRA L. REv. 17, 17 (1981)
("due process and full faith and credit clauses impose few limitations on choice of law").
408. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. But see Allstate, 449 U.S. 334-36 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that due process clause prohibits application of law only casually or slightly
related to litigation). A number of commentators have argued that the contacts in Allstate were insuf-
ficient to support choice of forum law. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate
Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1315, 1328-33 (1981); Silberman,
Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFRA L. REv. 103 (1981); von Mehren & Trautman, Constitutional
Control of Choice of Law. Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFs A L. REv. 35 (1981).
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neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."409 The Shutts case adds that,
"[w]hen considering fairness in this context, an important element is the
expectation of the parties."4 '
The Court in Shutts did not attempt to specify which claims must be
resolved by Texas law, Oklahoma law, or any other law upon remand.
411
As Allstate indicates, the forum often has power to choose the applicable
law.412 To take but one example, the Kansas courts might be presented
with a genuine choice of law issue by a situation in which a leasehold is
located in one state, but all other contacts (such as the royalty owner's
residence, the place of lease execution, and the payment of royalty) are in
another.
These possibilities raise fascinating questions. To what extent can Kan-
sas apply its own law to unaffiliated transactions upon the remand of
Shutts? Does Kansas violate the Constitution if it systematically deter-
mines its choice of law principles so as to apply its law to the broadest
possible number of claims? 413 The answer seems to be yes. 41 4 The ques-
tion is not an idle one, because plaintiffs in Shutts consistently have ar-
gued for broad application of Kansas law 15 and naturally have done so
on remand.
416
C. The Forum's Tendency To Further Its Own Policy: Magnet Forums
After Shutts
The persistence of the magnet forum problem, after Shutts, may depend
upon whether the constitutional standards are loosely or tightly construed.
Loose requirements will enable the forum to prefer its own policy in dero-
gation of more significant interests in other states.
Even though his is a solitary dissent, Justice Stevens' opinion illustrates
the dimensions of the incentive to forum shop that remain after Shutts.
417
The dissent is a virtual road map of the ways in which a forum can prefer
its own law.'18 It raises issues on two levels: first, in finding the existence
of a conflict, and second, in resolving the conflict.
409. 449 U.S. at 313.
410. 105 S. Ct. at 2980.
411. Id. at 2981.
412. 449 U.S. at 312-13; accord Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2978.
413. See infra Section IV(C)(2).
414. Id.
415. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
416. On remand, the Seward County District Court concluded that the law of several of the most
germane states was the same as the law of Kansas and persisted in applying Kansas law across the
board. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 79-C-113 (Dist. Ct. Seward County, Kan. April 30,
1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-59588-AS (Kan. July 7, 1986). The case has now returned to the
Kansas Supreme Court.
417. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
418. See infra notes 419-29 and accompanying text.
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1. The Existence of a Conflict: The False "False Conflict" Case
A forum bent upon applying its own policy can do so, first, by the
simple device of declaring that no conflict exists.419 It can review the deci-
sions of other states in a way that reconciles them with its own law, find
separate grounds (such as waiver or estoppel) for reaching the result, or,
as the Kansas court in Shutts purported to do, invoke a separate body of
law in the name of equity. The worst-case scenario is that of a result-
oriented court, camouflaging its true reasoning with a contrived analysis
of another state's law.
The trouble with Justice Stevens' reasoning is that it would uphold a
result-oriented court in virtually every case. No two cases are ever pre-
cisely alike, and if any distinction will do, the forum always would be able
to choose its own law. The problem might be called the false "false con-
flict." The conflict is real, but it disappears because the forum says that it
does.42o
The majority opinion in Shutts is more pragmatic. It finds conflicts on
the basis of law that other states "most likely" would follow, because
probable outcomes are all that can be predicted.""1 A difficult problem of
administration may be presented, however, by the false "false conflict"
situation even if it is considered pragmatically. In the worst case scenario,
in which the forum deliberately misstates its reasoning, the result can be
corrected only if the Supreme Court detects that intention.
422
419. A choice of law question is not presented, in Justice Stevens' view, unless it involves an
"ambiguous conflict with the established law of another State." 105 S. Ct. at 2990 (emphasis in
original). "Putative" or "likely" conflicts would not suffice. Id.
420. Cf. 105 S. Ct. at 2989 (Justice Stevens' evaluation of Shutts as "a classic 'false conflicts'
case"). The decision of the Seward County Court on remand in Shutts is illustrative of the ability of
the forum court to choose its own law. See supra note 416.
421. See 105 S. Ct. at 2977-78. The Court's approach does not make completely clear the degree
of probability required for the finding of a conflict. In summarizing differences among states' laws,
the Court refers to "putative" conflicts, to law that other States "most likely" would follow, to law to
which Petitioner "points," to the interpretation of "at least one court," and to other tentative charac-
terizations. It then concludes that these "conflicts" cannot be labelled false "without a more thorough-
going treatment than was accorded them" by the Kansas court. Id. at 2978. Uncertainty in state law
naturally leads to uncertainty in determining conflicts. Thus the most reasonable interpretation of the
Court's reasoning may be that conflicts are to be found by analysis of probable holdings in other
jurisdictions.
422. Mere errors in reasoning, in a state court's sincere effort to discern another state's law,
ordinarily are not a constitutional violation. See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2987 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917)); id.
at 2992 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" 'To hold otherwise would render it possible to bring to this court
every case wherein the defeated party claimed that the statute of another state had been construed to
his detriment.' ") (quoting Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 491, 496 (1903)).
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2. Disposition of the Conflict
If a conflict does exist, the question remains: What choices can the fo-
rum constitutionally make? After Allstate and Shutts, that issue, in turn,
depends upon an evaluation of the contacts that the dispute has with dif-
ferent states, and particularly on the parties' expectations. 23
Although this test is general, several particulars can be stated. First,
conduct related to the litigation itself has little weight. A claimant, for
example, who initiated contacts with Kansas for the purpose of causing
Kansas law to attach, should not succeed.424 Second, at some point even a
forum that has some contact with the dispute must recognize that the in-
terests of another state are so much more significant than its own as to
require application of that state's law. For example, a single Kansas meet-
ing, with respect to a transaction consummated in Texas between Texas
residents regarding land in Texas, would not justify expectations that
Kansas law would be applied, and that result should be precluded by the
Constitution.42 '5 Third, unexplained inconsistencies in the application of
choice of law principles to a class action may signal a constitutional viola-
tion. If, for example, Kansas applied its own law to all Kansas residents
irrespective of the location of their leases, anfd also applied Kansas law to
all owners of Kansas leases irrespective of their residences, the inconsis-
tency would telegraph the intention to invade other states' sovereignty.
42 6
Finally, the constitutional limitations on choice of law should be inter-
preted to limit unreasonable forum shopping and preserve parties' expec-
tations. These are the policies that underlie Allstate and Shutts.427 In the
multistate class action, a context in which the magnet forum is a special
problem, it should be possible to judge the choice of law by its tendency to
encourage forum shopping.
42 8
423. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
424. Thus, in Allstate, plaintiff's change of residence to the forum was considered relevant be-
cause plaintiff had not moved "in anticipation of" litigation. 449 U.S. at 318-19. Similarly, the Shutts
Court refused to base choice of law on plaintiffs' "desire for forum law." 105 S. Ct. at 2979 (citing
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
425. See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2980 (quoting Allstate, 449 U.S. at 333) ("reasonable expectation
of the parties" is important element in choice of law analysis).
426. Given the jurisdictional holding of Shutts, choice of law is the principal protection of inter-
state federalism. Cf Drobak, supra note 229, at 1065 (calling for "[effective limits on choice of law,"
rather than minimum contacts, to protect state sovereignty). In Shutts, the Court recognized the argu-
ments of the Allstate dissent that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the forum to respect the
laws . . . of other States, subject to the forum's own interests in furthering its public policy." 105 S.
Ct. at 2979.
427. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality on facts for basing
application of law on insufficient contacts); Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2979-80.
428. See supra notes 392-97 and accompanying text (discussing magnet forum problem in multis-
tate class actions).
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D. Managing Choice of Law in the Fifty-State Action
1. Determining Unsettled Law
Even if the forum attempts to divide a class and apply the state law that
is appropriate to each subclass, it may experience difficulty in correctly
determining those laws.42  As the Supreme Court repeatedly has recog-
nized, the determination of unsettled state law is an inherently difficult
task. 410 For example, in Shutts, a conscientious forum attempting to apply
other states' laws would find that the task was made more difficult be-
cause only Oklahoma and Texas have reported cases dearly requiring in-
terest on suspended royalties. 4 1 Whether other states would even recog-
nize a claim for interest is uncertain. 3 2 An equally compelling example is
Miner v. Gillette Co. 43" Although many states have complex consumer
protection laws,' 3 ' few states have applied these statutes to the allegedly
deceptive conduct at issue in that case. 435 Some might decide that Gillette's
conduct was culpable; others with similar statutory language might regard
the conduct as wholly innocent.'36
State courts always have been assumed competent to apply the laws of
other states when adjudicating transitory causes of action.'37 The contem-
porary national class action, however, obliges them to undertake the task
on an unprecedented scale. Thus, a state court faced with deciding an
uncertain issue on the basis of its own plus forty-nine other states' laws
429. In Shutts I, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that Texas would permit
interest rates determined by federal regulation. 222 Kan. at 563-64, 567 P.2d at 1318-19. This pre-
diction proved incorrect when the Texas Supreme Court later limited interest to the Texas statutory
rate. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978).
430. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
431. See supra note 67.
432. In Boutte v. Chevron Oil Co., 316 F. Supp. 524, 531 (E.D. La. 1970), affid per curiam,
442 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1971), the court, in dictum, suggested that interest might be recoverable on
suspended royalties. Id. This dictum appears to conflict with Louisiana cases concerning interest. See,
e.g., Frankel v. Bellamore, 176 La. 1001, 147 So. 59 (1933).
433. 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S.
86 (1982). See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
434. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986). This Act
has produced voluminous litigation and commentary. See Comment, What Hath the Legislature
Wrought? A Critique of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act as Amended in 1977,29 BAYLOR L. REV.
525 (1977); Gibbs, Elmquist, Jillson & Rector, Creditor and Consumer Rights, 37 Sw. L.J. 189
(1983).
435. Gillette was noteworthy precisely because it was a new use of the class action. The situation
was unlikely to provoke litigation in any context other than a class action.
436. For an example of diametrically opposed holdings construing identical statutory language,
compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d
761, 763 (1961) ("tortious act" means "tort") with Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 460-63,
261 N.Y.S.2d 821-23, 209 N.E.2d 68, 77-79 (1965) (distinguishing "tortious act" within forum from
tort creating "injurious forum consequence" and criticizing analysis in Gray).
437. For an analysis of the issues presented by this assumption, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLI-T OF LAWS (1971).
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may tend either to impose its own conception of good policy or to assume
that other states would follow the forum's policies.438 Furthermore, a state
court hearing a nationwide class action in all likelihood will apply local
rules of evidence, statutes of limitations, and other procedural laws that
dramatically affect substantive results.
439
2. The Court's Ability To Focus and Decide the Fifty-State Action
Beyond the difficult task of correctly determining foreign law, the na-
tionwide class action may present an even greater problem because of the
sheer burden of organizing and following fifty or more different bodies of
complex substantive principles. 440 Although the comparison obviously is
inexact, one can appreciate the magnitude of the trial judge's task by
imagining a first-year law student who, instead of a course in contracts, is
required simultaneously to enroll in fifty courses, each covering the con-
tract law of a single state, and to apply each body of law correctly on the
final examination.441 Another way to appreciate the dimension of the task
is to consider that fifty opinions are more than most appellate judges write
in a year. The fifty-state-plus-foreign-countries class action may create a
comparable workload within the confines of a single case.442
A tempting solution is to group states with apparently similar laws for
decisionmaking purposes. 443 This approach may provide some benefit, but
it would be illusory to think that the mere act of classifying can reduce the
task to manageable proportions. 444 In order to group the states, the court
initially must make decisions about the meanings of the laws of each. This
438. See infra notes 451-52 and accompanying text ("national consensus" found in Agent
Orange).
439. Thus, for example, the court in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 n.10
(1984), noted the "considerable academic criticism of the rule that permits a forum State to apply its
own statute of limitations regardless of the significance of contacts between the forum State and the
litigation." The plaintiff in Keeton had chosen the forum because its statute provided a long limita-
tions period; limitations in most other States had run. The Court, however, did not determine
"whether any arguable unfairness rises to the level of a due process violation." Id. A similar issue
arises if a federal court sits in a diversity or federal question case, although it is less likely to apply
local law in these matters.
440. See supra notes 435-36 and accompanying text (complexity of different sets of laws in
Gillette).
441. The analogy understates the difficulty of the trial judge's task. A judge must rule on discov-
ery and evidence matters, deal with counsel, hear and find facts, and simultaneously handle the hun-
dreds (or thousands) of other matters on her docket.
442. The comparison is inexact; the trial judge's task in some respects is less difficult, and in other
respects more difficult, than an appellate judge's.
443. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 18, 428 N.E.2d 478, 484 (1981), cert. granted, 456
U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
444. The Gillette court placed that burden squarely on the plaintiff. 87 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 428
N.E.2d at 484 ("We believe that the issue of whether the common question of fact or the individual
questions of law predominate in the present case is dependent upon plaintiff's ability to establish that
the differing laws of the States are subject to grouping in a manageable number of subclasses.").
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approach, in effect, may amount to shifting those decisions to a time
before the states are grouped. If the state classifications merely are tenta-
tive, the result may be two sets of decisions, one before and one after.
Either approach may mean that the same quantum of decisionmaking ul-
timately will be necessary.
Of course, the classification of states might reduce effort dramatically if
differences among bodies of law were to be compromised.' 45 Thus, in in-
stances in which the general statutory language in two different states is
similar, or when most states have no law resolving a disputed point, these
superficial indications might result in their being grouped together and
claims of their residents decided identically.4" The point is that the com-
promising of real but hard-to-perceive differences is at odds with Shutts
but, in some cases, the court may have a tendency to group various states
together as a natural result of Shutts' encouragement of multistate class
actions.
447
It is difficult to overstate the pressure towards this kind of compromise.
In Agent Orange, for example, the court initially achieved uniformity by
applying federal common law to all claims.44' After this decision was re-
versed by the Second Circuit,449 Judge Weinstein reached the same uni-
formity-this time, by finding a nationwide consensus.45  Although this
basis for uniformity seems tenuous,4§i the decision may be defended on the
pragmatic grounds that it was necessary for the satisfactory resolution of
this unique case. The court and attorneys in Agent Orange otherwise
might have wasted resources in crystal ball gazing to determine legal is-
sues that actually were indeterminable. The settlement of Agent Orange
demonstrates that the game of highly refined law determination may not
always be worth the candle and that rough justice is better than none.
However, the application of uniform law is a legitimate policy choice that
445. The Gillette approach of creating a "manageable" number of subclasses may create a subtle
compromise between management and fidelity to other states' laws. The Third Circuit in In re Asbes-
tos School Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (1986), observed that "the
dictates of state law may not be buried under the vast expanse of a federal class action."
446. Cf supra note 436 (similar statutory language yields opposing results).
447. See Comment, supra note 2, at 804 n.73 ("The usual risks involved interpreting unfamiliar
laws increase exponentially in a nationwide class action."). This phenomenon matters because "each
state will apply rules of law that will further the interests of [its] citizens." Id. Such misinterpretation
frustrates other states' efforts "to effectuate the social and economic policy decisions underlying their
own substantive laws." Id.; see supra Section IV(A) (discussing forum shopping).
448. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd,
635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
449. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
450. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
451. The Second Circuit, in denying mandamus to decertify the class, said, "[wlhile we will not
disclaim considerable skepticism as to the existence of a 'national substantive rule,' we note Chief
Judge Weinstein's declared intention to create subclasses as dictated by variations in state law." In re
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1067 (1984).
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is better approached in a direct and honest way than through the subter-
fuge of simply fudging differences among state laws to reach a disingenu-
ous conclusion that they are "all the same."
A trial judge presiding over a nationwide class action must avoid being
unable to see the forest for the trees, and subclassing and grouping of
states may be useful for that organizational purpose. At the same time,
however, the judge must avoid obscuring important differences. And since
class actions come in all sizes, shapes, and degrees of merit, the judge must
adjust his attitude on these questions to fit the case before the court.
3. The Role of Counsel: Redundant Briefing and Conflicts of
Interest
The fifty-state-plus-foreign-countries class action also will alter the role
of attorneys representing and opposing the class. Attorneys may find it
necessary to research every substantive issue in fifty-part redundancy and
to present the result to the court in a readily comprehensible form.4 2 The
time and money necessary to do so may be beyond the capacity of many
lawyers and firms.4"5 New briefing techniques may need to be developed,
especially to present the law to a state trial judge, typically operating
without law clerks, often with somewhat limited research tools and a
docket including thousands of other cases.
Furthermore, subtle kinds of conflicts of interest4 54 may arise from the
grouping of state residents within subclasses. The use of a given choice of
law principle or the use of a certain procedural device may mean that
residents of state X receive an increased recovery at the expense of resi-
dents of state Y, who receive less. In Shutts, for example, if Kansas law
had been chosen on the basis of leasehold location, the result would have
benefitted different individuals than if some other set of contacts had pro-
vided the test.4" 5 Which clients should class counsel favor? Or should it be
concluded that these concerns are too ethereal for a practical world, given
that none would recover at all without class counsel's efforts? 458
452. Cf supra notes 440-47 (difficulty of deciding 50 states' laws).
453. A requirement that class attorneys engage other counsel, including counsel in other states,
may be appropriate.
454. Lawyers' abilities particularly may be put to the test during the initial step of subclassing. At
this stage, counsel may lack familiarity with nationwide differences and judicial decisionmaking may
be summary. Even so, the classifications, even if imperfect, are likely to affect later outcomes.
455. Kansas residents probably would receive more money if law had been chosen on the basis of
residence; nonresident holders of Kansas leases probably would receive more money if it had been
chosen on the basis of lease location.
456. The answer, within limits, appears to be yes. See In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 84-6231 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 1986); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1975).
Class counsel may attempt to avoid manageability problems created by fifty different sets of substan-
tive laws by offering to prove his case under the most difficult state's laws. That approach was ex-
plored in Asbestos. Although this pragmatic solution may be advantageous in some cases, one arguable
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In ordinary litigation, consent based on disclosure of the conflict to the
client is an appropriate cure, but in a class action it would be impractical.
The problem is exacerbated because conflicts may not be recognized until
the case is well developed,' 57 and because they will tend to be masked by
settlement and compromise.458 Furthermore, this conflict of interest is not
merely potential; it is an unavoidable part of the process of subclassing for
choice of law purposes.
A court hearing a multistate class action ordinarily should provide sep-
arate representation for subgroups with conflicting interests.45 9 Given the
subtlety of conflicts in the class action context and the unavailability of
consent as a cure, the court should take this action when a substantial
probability of conflict appears.460 However, this advice should be tem-
pered with realism. Appointing fifty-plus sets of independent attorneys in
Gillette, for example, would impose costs that might exceed expected dif-
ferences in recovery and would increase management burdens for the
court beyond their worth." 1
V. PROCEDURAL TOOLS FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF
MULTISTATE CLASS ACTIONS
The Shutts decision increases the degree to which judges must assume
the role of litigation managers-a role they already had assumed prior to
Shutts.4' 2 Fortunately, there are judicial tools with which to address the
issues that Shutts raises. Federal district judges who can draw upon mas-
ters, magistrates, law clerks, and other resources may make ready use of
these tools. The greatest difficulty probably will be that these techniques
also must be used by solitary rural state judges with large dockets and
little support.
difficulty with the proposal is that it reflects a conflict of interest. It may be seen as compromising the
interests of claimants from more plaintiff-oriented states. Indeed, it might be argued that in cases with
significant damages, class members should be notified of major differences that might result from
classification and invited to come forward with evidence showing contacts their claims might have
with states whose law is favorable.
457. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 425 (W.D. Mo.) (court discovered at
certification hearing that intervenor's counsel had failed to disclose potential conflict of interest), va-
cated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
458. See supra text accompanying note 451.
459. See R. MARCUs & E. SHERMAN, supra note 22, at 276; Developments in the Law-Class
Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1479-82 (1976).
460. Cf Skywalk, 93 F.R.D. at 425 (advocating class-wide resolution of claims to avoid conflicts
of interest created by counsel representing more than one damage claimant).
461. But see infra text accompanying note 493 (discussing use of local counsel in 50 state action).
462. See generally Miller, The Adversary System, supra note 4, at 19-22 (1984) (lawyers more
willing to accept judicial management and judges more willing to exercise it).
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A. The Certification Decision
The existence of multistate jurisdiction does not mean that it must be
exercised in every instance. Federal Rule 23(b)(3), and state rules pat-
terned upon it, expressly requires the court to consider whether common
questions "predominate" and whether "a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy."'40 3 The interests of class members, the existence of other litigation,
the desirability of the forum, and, in general, "the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action," are the factors that the
Rule says are "pertinent. 48 4 Thus, most of the questions raised in this
Article are encompassed within the matters properly considered in the cer-
tification hearing of a class action under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) and its
state counterparts.
For example, the magnet forum phenomenon might induce counsel to
bring an action such as Shutts in Maine, Hawaii, or another state having
little or no interest in it.485 The Supreme Court's holding would support
the state's jurisdiction as a matter of raw power.468 The appropriate re-
sponse for the trial court, however, would be to deny certification by a
finding pursuant to subdivision (b)(3) that it is "undesirable" to "concen-
trat[e] the litigation ...in the particular forum."
47
A persuasive argument can be made on this ground that, even given the
Supreme Court's holding, the trial court in Shutts would have acted more
appropriately had it denied certification. It is "undesirable," to use the
word found in Rule 23, to concentrate litigation of gas lease claims in a
forum having no connection with fully ninety-nine percent of the leases
and ninety-seven percent of the claimants.48 This conclusion is reinforced
by the existence in Shutts of forums, such as Oklahoma " and Texas, in
which far more substantial state interests existed and in which the Shutts
plaintiffs had filed previous claims that had been dismissed.4 70 A decision
against certification would not have left the class members without a
remedy.
471
463. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). These principles would not apply to Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes, but (except for the mandatory class issue) those subsections probably will give rise to fewer
problems of the kinds posed in Shutts.
464. Id.
465. See supra notes 392-405 and accompanying text. The inducement would be forum law pro-
viding for clear interest liability at high rates, coupled with principles favoring choice of that law;
state interests in the litigation would be strategically irrelevant.
466. 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
467. FED. R. Csv. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
468. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
469. Phillips itself took the position that "Oklahoma appears to be. . .a proper forum to bind
all plaintiffs," even if minimum contacts were required. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 45.
470. See supra note 397.
471. The Kansas court concluded that limitations would bar recovery in other states. 235 Kan. at
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Similarly, unusual difficulties in choice or ascertainment of law are a
management problem that should be taken into account in certification.
Gillette7 12 is an example. The wide diversity of applicable laws, scarcity
of definitive authority, and the small amount in controversy for each
claimant, may have meant that harm to interstate federalism would out-
weigh the benefits of a nationwide action.7 3
These kinds of management or forum difficulties sometimes may be
solved without completely denying certification. It may be possible to de-
fine a lesser included class, or a class sharing an interest in a given issue,
for which it remains desirable to concentrate the litigation in the forum.
Similarly, it may be possible to divide the class into subclasses, and to
insure that each is separately represented, to highlight the development of
other states' law.474 If the problems remain significant compared to the
advantages, however, certification should be denied in favor of litigation
elsewhere. Perhaps this reasoning may cause some movement, even after
Shutts, toward statewide actions or classes defined in terms of the court's
traditional jurisdiction over claimants.4 5
B. Deference to Other Tribunals: The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens, Section 1404(a) Transfer, the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation, and Stay Orders
Although class certification may be a way of taking into account the
appropriateness of the forum, there will be times when the old-fashioned
doctrine of forum non conveniens may be superior.476 Certification rules
may not enable the court to consider directly the defendant's cooperation
in removing procedural barriers to suit in an otherwise preferable fo-
rum.47 7 For example, the Kansas court in Shutts concluded that other fo-
rums were inappropriate because of statutes of limitations that would bar
suit.' 78 Even if this conclusion had been correct, forum non conveniens
might have allowed the court to condition dismissal of the Kansas action
upon defendant's waiver of limitations defenses elsewhere.4 79
204, 679 P.2d at 1169. It did not, however, examine the statutes of other states in so holding. Many
jurisdictions recognize tolling of limitations during the pendency of a class action.
472. Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981).
473. See supra text accompanying notes 231-42 (Gillette and interstate federalism).
474. See supra notes 459-61 and accompanying text.
475. See infra Section V(C).
476. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981). See generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 199, § 3828 (discussing forum
non conveniens).
477. Cf Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 345 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contrasting
breadth of forum non conveniens to holding under venue transfer provision).
478. See supra note 471.
479. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 298 (4th ed. 1985); see also In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal,
The Yale Law Journal
In the federal system, venue provisions afford the court discretion to
transfer the action to any other district and division where it might have
been brought.4 °0 In class actions, district judges have used transfer in
novel ways, such as ordering a liability determination for the entire class
followed by transfer of subclass litigation to other districts for damage
determinations.8" The federal system also provides the advantages of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which can order transfer of
cases for consolidated pretrial proceedings. 4 2 This procedure would be
useful in the event of multiple competing class actions if all happened to
be in the federal system, particularly since most could probably be dis-
posed of in the transferee districts.
48 3
Competing actions in different state courts, or in a state and a federal
court, present more difficult problems. 4  The less appropriate forum, de-
termined by state interests and aggregation of contacts, should dismiss if
the action is in its early stages, or stay its own proceedings if not, to pre-
vent irrational resolution by a race to judgment. A federal court might
stay its proceedings, or, in an unusual case, might invoke the abstention
doctrine, to defer to a state court, if important state policies are at issue
and if the litigation has ties to one particular state.48 5 A mass tort present-
ing novel questions of liability might be an example. 86 On the other
hand, it frequently will be appropriate for state courts to defer to federal
courts, owing to their superior ability to handle complex, multidistrict liti-
gation. In some cases intersystem cooperation should be arranged, at least
for purposes of discovery and motion practice, a device that seems particu-
larly useful when the state and federal claims arise from a common trans-
action or occurrence or when parallel state and federal claims are
involved.
An early multiparty telephone conference, including the two "compet-
India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (conditioning forum non conveniens dismissal
upon defendant's agreement to waive statute of limitations defense).
480. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982); see Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 345 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
481. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978); f. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (outlining case management plan).
482. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). See generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 199, §
3862 (discussing transfer under § 1407).
483. The Panel is not limited, as is § 1404(a) transfer, to forums where each action might have
been brought. Compare Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 345 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
with authorities cited supra note 482.
484. See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
485. Abstention is actually a collection of doctrines. See BT Investment Managers, Inc. v. Lewis,
559 F.2d 950, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (stay or dismissal of federal suit conflicting with state
proceeding in interest of "wise judicial administration").
486. The Skywalk case was managed largely by the state courts, owing to the reversal of federal
mandatory certification. See Wright & Colussi, supra note 173, at 143.
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ing" trial judges, may be highly desirable as a practical matter in this
situation. Care should be taken that all parties have notice, that inappro-
priate ex parte contacts are avoided, and that neither jurisdiction's pretrial
rule prohibits the conference.48 7 If competing actions become common, so-
lutions such as redefinition of federal jurisdiction488 and revision of the
anti-injunction statute may become worth considering.48 9
C. Deference to Statewide Actions as a Management Tool: Do Efficiency
Concerns Dictate Otherwise?
Our analysis suggests that some of the problems of jurisdiction and
choice of law could be solved by resort to statewide, as opposed to nation-
wide, class actions.490 This result could be reached by the denial of certifi-
cation in a nationwide action, by transfer, or by other mechanisms. 49  The
solution would avoid many of the problems of competing actions, binding
effect, or application of unfamiliar law.
However, duplicative statewide actions could result in severely reduced
efficiency. If, in a case such as Gillette, fifty actions in fifty states were
required, it seems unlikely that many of them would be brought.492 Alter-
natively, actions might be brought in populous states, while claimants in
other states would have no redress. The federalism benefits hardly would
be worthwhile if consumers in New York and California recovered but
received less than they otherwise might, while those in Montana or New
Mexico did not recover at all. The multiplication of judicial effort, more-
over, is a cost that might offset potential gains.
On the other hand, one may question these premises. If plaintiffs' attor-
neys are denied certification of the nationwide class they propose, they
may contract with counsel in other states to bring actions there.49  The
result will not be a complete duplication of effort; instead, local counsel
presumably will concentrate on local law while relying on national coun-
sel for common issues. Pretrial proceedings, such as discovery, probably
487. This procedure was followed in In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29,
1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). In Skywalk, ex parte contacts initiated by the judge, even
though apparently innocent, created the perception that some claimants had opportunities to obtain
more favorable results and prompted disqualification motions that required judicial effort to resolve.
93 F.R.D. at 425-28.
488. Cf supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (requirements for diversity jurisdiction).
489. Cf supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (discussing Anti-Injunction Act). See gener-
ally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BErWEEN STATES AND
FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter ALI 1969 STUDY] (suggesting changes in federal jurisdiction).
490. See supra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 463-89 and accompanying text.
492. Cf supra note 75 (certification in Shutts based on value of class action to "small man").
Another source bf difficulty is that different state actions might lead to inconsistent verdicts, which
might create res judicata or collateral estoppel problems.
493. Cf. supra note 453 (appointment of counsel may also avoid conflict of interests).
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could be carried out on a national scale.4 94 The filing and pendency of a
suit in a local court does entail some cost, but if the suit is part of a
national effort, that cost should be reduced considerably. If settlement ne-
gotiations are conducted between the defendant and national counsel, they
will reflect federalism concerns, because they will anticipate results in dif-
ferent statewide forums; however, they will be conducted efficiently. It
might be that the added costs in each forum faced by national counsel
would include only those of filing suit and of retaining local counsel,
whose efforts might be necessary in any case for the development of local
law.
Whether this optimistic scenario is justified, or whether the Kansas
court was correct in Shutts when it criticized the defendant's arguments as
a strategy of "divide and conquer, '495 probably depends upon the com-
plexion of the individual class action at issue. In Shutts, for example, sep-
arate actions in Texas and Oklahoma might have been justified both by
the contrast between those states' laws and the law of Kansas, and by the
large number of claimants in those states. A coordinated effort could have
been expected, particularly since parties in Shutts had filed and dismissed
an earlier action in Oklahoma. 498 This coordination might have meant
little loss in efficiency. In other cases, such as Gillette, the proliferation of
actions necessary to obtain federalism gains might not be justified.
D. Notice: Rule 23(dX3) and the Case for Variable Notice
Eloquent arguments have been made to the effect that class notice is an
overstated concern. Professor Kenneth Dam, for example, asks, "Who
needs it?" He answers the question as follows: 49
7
Resjudicata operates against class members, and so they do not ben-
efit directly. As for defendants, they will not normally place much
value on binding class members. If a defendant loses, the merger
effect of res judicata is usually irrelevant. As for barring further
actions by class members, it would be the rare class member who
would attempt to tread the same ground as the unsuccessful repre-
sentative plaintiff. To the extent that class actions are the result of a
494. The information-gathering function, which is likely to be the most important aspect of dis-
covery in such a case, is not affected by rules governing use in court. Furthermore, coordination could
enable a single deposition to qualify for use in many forums.
The MER/29 litigation is an example of the successful use of this kind of coordination. "The
MER/29 Group's primary achievement was management of mass pretrial discovery. By agreement
with the defendant, all discovery carried out by the Group's representatives was made applicable to all
cases. . . ." Rheingold, The MERI29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 127 (1968).
495. Shutts II, 235 Kan. at 202, 679 P.2d at 1169.
496. See supra note 397.
497. Dam, supra note 27, at 120.
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lawyer's entrepreneurship, second actions need hardly be feared, for
what entrepreneur would invest time and money in a venture al-
ready demonstrated to be profitless? Since the absent class members
would be asserting claims presumably identical in every substantive
respect with those of the representative plaintiff, the doctrine of stare
decisis would apply in an uncommonly powerful way.
This analysis is appealing,498 and it may be useful in many kinds of ac-
tions; but like most generalizations, it requires qualification. All multistate
class actions must comply with the due process minima set forth in
Shutts. 49 ' Furthermore, although pressures on the entrepreneurial lawyer
do encourage him to concentrate on claims with merit, in some quarters
there is a surprisingly large quantum of repetitive and vexatious, if ulti-
mately doomed, litigation. 500
Some class actions, such as Gillette,50 concern claims so small that re-
sources spent on notice seem largely wasted, and minimal lawful compli-
ance may be appropriate. Others, such as Shutts, may contain both mod-
est claimants and claimants with larger amounts at stake.502 Still others,
such as Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C.,
5803
may consist primarily of significant claims. Finally, there are actions that
include both very small and very large claims. 504
The assumption that significant claims will be protected satisfactorily in
the latter types of actions without careful notice is unwarranted, because
many people may tend to discard boilerplate documents they receive in the
mail. 505 Cutoff of the right to assert one's own claim, or even loss of the
chance to participate in a class recovery, may follow.50 The argument in
498. See Miller, Administering Relief supra note 5, at 501-13. The responses received in the
North Carolina tetracycline case provide documentary evidence of the limited usefulness of notice. See
supra note 162.
499. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
500. For example, litigation by convicted state prisoners has increased almost 700% between 1961
and 1982, although relief is granted in a very small fraction of cases (approximately three percent).
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE PRISONER PETI-
TIONS-HABEAS CORPUS 1-5 (1984); see also Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus
and Its Reform: An Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 694 n.73 (1982) (examining disposi-
tion of habeas cases). The tendency to relitigate extends to prisoners' class actions. See, e.g., Bogard v.
Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978). In the corporate context, the phenomenon of the strike suit led to
a requirement of verified pleadings for stockholders' derivative claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
501. 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S.
86 (1982).
502. Although the average amount of the claims in Shutts was "about $100," 105 S. Ct. at 2974,
the class included all royalty owners, large and small.
503. 758 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 228 (1985). For a discussion of the case, see
supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
504. The Skywalk case, for example, included not only large claims for wrongful death, but also
smaller claims for minor physical or psychic injury. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 13 & n.56.
505. See supra note 131 (S2 million settlement fund yields less than $18,000 in payable claims).
506. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
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these situations may be about more than notice; it may reflect a judgment
that efficiency concerns justify some possibilities of erroneous adjudication
without either affiliation with the forum or real consent.507
In some actions, the court should address these concerns directly by en-
hanced notice. Rule 23(d)(2) empowers a federal court to require that
notice be given "in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of
the [class] members," concerning "any step in the action."5 In addition,
the court may require the members "to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate." 509
For example, the court might require certified mail to claimants with
potential claims exceeding a threshold (which the court might set at
$5,000, $10,000, or even $50,000) to avoid even the appearance of unnec-
essary burdens. It might use a form that contains both an opt-in and an
opt-out choice, so that it can verify whether the addressee has taken con-
scious action in response to the notice and follow up by ordering further
steps if a significant claimant does not respond. In appropriate circum-
stances, Rule 23(d) may give the court discretion to require that claimants
opt in rather than out, as a means of insuring the fair conduct of the
action even though the opt-out procedure would satisfy due process min-
ima. Furthermore, the court can put special effort into insuring that per-
sons with significant claims at the settlement or damage stage are afforded
certified mail notice, or that a response is elicited, since the claims stage is
in reality the point at which there is usually the greatest likelihood of loss.
In some actions, such as Gillette, minimal notice may be followed by a
lump-sum award that is distributed inexpensively. In general, however, a
class member whose claim is significantly larger than minimum collection
expenses, and who might have real options if given notice, "needs it," if
only to insure that he asserts the claim upon disposition. The court should
provide the protections that Shutts requires in every action.510 In many
cases, it should insist upon more.
VI. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY SHUTTS
Many of the problems presented by multistate class actions are of na-
tional dimensions. It is conceivable that they could be worked out by judi-
cial development, but that solution would take years, create considerable
507. All due process issues ultimately involve this comparison in some way. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (due process requires consideration of risk of erroneous depriva-
tion by failure to provide hearing).
508. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
509. Id.
510. This observation should be qualified by the recognition that there may be cases in which
Shutts will not require individual mailed notice. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
Vol. 96: 1, 1986
Multistate Class Actions After Shutts
uncertainty, and contribute significantly to the complexity of class litiga-
tion.51 Furthermore, a policy of judicial evolution would produce incon-
sistencies of result and conflicts between state and federal courts. 512 Al-
though the significance of the issues may make consensus difficult to
achieve, a national legislative solution may be preferable to the common
law process.
One possibility is a statute creating federal subject matter jurisdiction in
multiparty, multistate cases, based upon the diversity of citizenship clause
or the commerce clause. The idea of federal jurisdiction in multiparty,
multistate disputes-whether in class form or not-is hardly new,5 13 but
it has particular impetus today because the subject is part of an ongoing
study of complex litigation by the American Law Institute.5" 4
One legislative approach is a statute providing for federal jurisdiction in
cases of minimal diversity,5" 5 when a threshold number of claimants allege
individual injuries exceeding certain dollar amounts.516 If coupled with
congressional reversal of the rule in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,517
so that smaller claimants could be included in an action that is within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, the proposal would create a federal fo-
rum for actions in which the nationwide coordination available in the fed-
eral system is most needed. 51 ' The legislation also could address some of
the problems of forum choice and management that Shutts raises.
511. For example, in the asbestos litigation, the doubtful authority of the courts to undertake
innovative solutions has retarded the resolution of a serious nationwide problem. See Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). On the other hand, the volume of litigation has
induced some courts to embrace solutions of dubious validity. See cases cited supra note 481.
512. The Asbestos School case is an example. See supra notes 351-66 and accompanying text.
Shutts itself is an example of interstate conflict. See supra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.
513. See ALI 1969 STuDy, supra note 489, at 67-76, 375-410 (proposing expansion of federal
jurisdiction in multiparty, multistate cases); Kamp, The Shrinking Forum: The Supreme Court's Lim-
itation of Jurisdiction-An Argument for a Federal Forum in Multi-Party, Multi-State Litigation,
21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 182-89 (1979) (advocating adoption of 1969 ALI proposal); Rowe &
Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multistate, Multiparty Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. (forth-
coming Dec. 1986); cf. Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional
Theory, 15 GA. L. REv. 19 (1980). There have been various proposals before Congress that would
have created federal jurisdiction in multistate, multiparty cases. E.g. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdic-
tionIMagistrates Reform-1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-62 (1979)
(containing Justice Department proposal for multiparty, multistate federal jurisdiction in mass acci-
dent cases) [hereinafter Justice Department proposal]; H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. 5918 (1983) (proposal of Rep. Kastenmeier).
514. Institute to Explore Possibility of Undertaking Study of Complex Civil Litigation, 7 A.L.I.
REP. 1 (Jan. 1985). Professor Miller is Reporter for the Study.
515. Cf State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (statute providing for
federal jurisdiction in interpleader cases upon the existence of minimal diversity, or the presence in
the suit of at least one pair of adverse parties with diverse citizenship, permissible under Article III).
516. This rule would have maximum effectiveness in mass disaster cases. See infra note 524 and
accompanying text.
517. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See supra note 22.
518. Maximum effectiveness probably requires liberalizing notions of pendent and ancillary juris-
diction, which means imposing legislative constraints on some of the narrowing of ancillary jurisdic-
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Any expansion of federal jurisdiction, however, should be carefully lim-
ited, so that it does not result in the federalizing of all class action prac-
tice. An overly inclusive statute would dump into the federal courts small-
claims class actions that state courts are as well or better equipped to
handle efficiently. It also might denigrate the authority of state courts or
countermand state policies. The creation of a federal forum for Gillette-
type actions, for example, probably would be undesirable. 19
The adoption of significant thresholds for the amount in controversy
and the number of claimants-perhaps a requirement that at least five or
ten claimants assert claims exceeding $25,000 or $50,000-could prevent
this result.52 In the alternative, jurisdiction over smaller claims could be
made dependent upon the need for a federal forum to bring all appropri-
ate parties before the court or to prevent inefficient, scattered litigation
that transcends state boundaries.5"' Yet another possible restriction would
be to limit federal jurisdiction to actions in which at least one defendant is
of different residence from the other defendants or from any place where
liability-producing events have occurred.522 This last condition would
identify cases in which scattered suits, joinder difficulties, or choice of law
problems would be most significant,52 and the argument for a federal
forum strongest.
The creation of federal jurisdiction need not be reserved to class actions.
For example, a statute could establish a federal forum and offer consolida-
tion techniques for the unification of scattered nonclass litigation. This
proposal would have maximum utility in mass disaster cases, such as an
airplane crash or a bus-automobile collision, 524 and products liability and
tion implicit in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). See generally 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RE-
LATED MATTERS 2d § 3523 (1984) (discussing ancillary jurisdiction); Note, Protective Jurisdiction
and Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Con-
sumer Class Actions, 69 MICH. L. REv. 710 (1971) (analyzing congressional schemes to expand
federal jurisdiction in consumer cases).
519. See supra notes 231-42 and accompanying text.
520. These thresholds were featured in the Justice Department proposal of 1979. See authorities
cited supra note 513.
521. For example, removal could be authorized in the class action context whenever two compet-
ing class actions, not otherwise within federal subject matter jurisdiction, were brought in the courts of
different states.
522. Cf ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 489, at 386-88 (taking into account dispersion of potential
or necessary defendants). This result also follows from proposals that the American Law Institute
Study Project on Complex Litigation is now considering.
523. The existence of multiple defendants in differing locations would increase the chances of
joinder difficulties and scattered suits in nonclass as well as class litigation. Id. In class actions, differ-
ent locations for liability-producing acts and defendants' residences are more likely to be correlated
with choice of law difficulties.
524. The well-known case of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) is
an excellent illustration. A collision in northern California between a bus and a truck produced sepa-
rate federal and state suits in several different places. The Supreme Court prevented one defendant's
insurer's efforts to use federal interpleader to consolidate the claims, indicating that the federal statute
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toxic substance litigation involving parties from multiple states. But class
actions could be among the types of litigation most improved by the pro-
posal, particularly in the aftermath of the Shutts decision. The extension
of federal jurisdiction would mean that a case potentially requiring appli-
cation of fifty states' laws would be heard by a judge who is more likely to
have support personnel and other resources adequate to the task than is
the average state judge. 2 5 Likewise, federal jurisdiction could reduce un-
certainties about the preclusive effects of class decrees. 526 The mechanisms
for transfer and multidistrict consolidation available in the federal system
could eliminate the incidence of multiple, competing nationwide class ac-
tions,521 although amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act528 would be
needed for maximum utility because of the prospect of competing federal
and state actions. Consideration also might be given to employing an ex-
panded federal subject matter jurisdiction for classwide adjudication of one
or more critical common issues and allowing the individual issues to be
adjudicated in those state or federal courts in which actions have been
commenced. In effect, this proposal would enable greater use of the partial
class action now provided for in Federal Rule 23(d)(2).
Proposals for multiparty, multistate federal jurisdiction logically would
have to provide for mandatory joinder and nationwide service of pro-
cess. 529 These provisions could go far toward rationalizing the use of
mandatory class actions after Shutts. The best method of addressing this
issue in the class context may be to grant the district court discretion to
prevent claimants from opting out when a class action is within the fed-
eral jurisdiction over multiparty, multistate actions, provided that the
four-factor test proposed earlier in this Article for mandatory classes is
met.530 These joinder and process provisions might be more effective if
accompanied by liberalized transfer and consolidation privileges that
would eliminate some of the barriers of existing law. For example, trans-
fer by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation could be permitted for all
was not intended as a bill of peace in mass tort cases. An elaborate federal complex litigation statute
could provide for mandatory consolidation that might have the practical effect of creating a new form
of class action to cover situations such as Tashire. Notions of compulsory consolidation might even
embrace cases pending in both state and federal courts.
525. See supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
527. See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
528. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982); see supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
529. See Justice Department proposal, supra note 513; ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 489, at
401-02. See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 206, § 1067 (discussing service of process).
Proposals now before the American Law Institute Study Project on Complex Litigation, not limited to
class actions, also would have these features. See supra note 514.
530. See supra Section III(C). A special committee of the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association has recommended discretionary authority to certify mandatory classes. See supra note 266
and accompanying text.
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purposes, not merely for pretrial practice as under existing law.5"' In ad-
dition, the limitation on transfer to a district where the action "might have
been brought" originally," 2 and the current Supreme Court constructions
of that phrase,"' should be eliminated to the extent due process permits
full transfer to a locale in which personal jurisdiction would have been
initially improper. Intersystem coordination could be improved by widen-
ing the possibility for removing from state courts cases that are related to
a multiparty, multistate case lodged in the federal courts or by developing
procedures for marshalling the judicial resources of both the federal and
state courts and bringing them jointly to bear on the adjudication of the
pieces of the litigation.
Finally, multiparty, multistate federal jurisdiction could be accompa-
nied by a federal provision for choice of law. In cases controlled by state
law, the proposed statute could direct the district court itself to determine
which state's law should apply rather than relying upon the forum's
choice of law principles as is required by current doctrine. 534 Adherence to
state choice of law principles in multistate class actions or other types of
complex litigation is burdensome for the forum court and may lead to the
application of conflicts rules that are inappropriate to these cases. There is
little doubt that congressional power to enact a choice of law rule exists
under the diversity jurisdiction, due process, privileges and immunities,





531. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). See generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 199,
at §§ 3861-68 (discussing multidistrict litigation).
532. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
533. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). See generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 199, at § 3845 (discussing limitations on transfer).
534. In the absence of a federal choice of law rule, a federal court hearing a diversity case must
follow state choice of law rules. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); see also Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975)
(reaffirming Klaxon). The weight of these precedents makes it unlikely that a federal common law
conflicts rule will be developed. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATrERS § 4506 (1982) (discussing
choice of law in federal court); Horowitz, Towards a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14
UCLA L. REv. 1191 (1967) (same). However, it seems doubtful that Klaxon would countermand a
federal statute governing choice of state law, even in a diversity case. See ALI 1969 STUDY, supra
note 489, at 402-04. As Agent Orange shows, the federal interest in rationalizing choice of law in
multistate, multiparty disputes in the federal courts is great. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (strong federal interest shown by existence of constitutional jury trial
provision causes federal distribution of power between judge and jury to apply in diversity case).
Furthermore, the matter is one that fairly can be characterized as procedural, and a federal enactment
therefore should control. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (federal policies reflected in
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control matters "falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, . . . rationally capable of classification as either").
535. See generally ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 489, at Supporting Memorandum C, 442-48; A.
VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 1227-32 (1965); Brilmayer & Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of
Federalism: A Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE
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Given the magnet forum issues raised by Shutts itself, a federal choice
of law rule is at least as likely to reduce forum shopping as it is to in-
crease it.536 Furthermore, rather than using the highly artificial, but ad-
mittedly pragmatic, technique of finding a national consensus on a legal
point, as in Agent Orange,537 or simply ignoring differences in state law,
a federal statute could rationalize the search for a workable conflicts rule
by forthrightly directing the district court to consider both substantive pol-
icies and the need for a uniform rule of decision.
538
Unfortunately, no single choice of law principle is intuitively correct.
Nor does it seem obvious that Congress is likely to do a more adequate job
in the choice of law field than have the states. Thus the drafting of a
federal choice of law statute presents serious difficulties. If the text is
highly precise, there is a risk that there will be insufficient flexibility to
permit courts to produce sensible results. Conversely, legislation that pro-
vides the courts with significant discretion is likely to produce inconsistent
results and offer little predictability.
The viability of these proposals depends upon practical, philosophical
and political considerations that are well beyond the scope of this Article.
Any legislation must be appraised in terms of its ability to ameliorate the
problems to which it is directed without either creating so much threshold
litigation over its applicability as to make it counterproductive or promot-
ing forum shopping incentives that lead to its inequitable administration.
The political considerations would include concerns about the adverse im-
pact of the newly created jurisdiction on the workload of the federal
courts, the desirability of expanding the authority of unelected federal
judges, upsetting the delicate balance between federal and state courts re-
flected in "Our Federalism," 539 and the costs attributable to procedural
DAME L. REv. 833 (1985); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimi-
nation in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960); Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 402 (1964);
Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reap-
praisal, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 33 (1957); Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI.
L. REv. 440 (1982). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1019-20
(1985), the Court indicated that the only limitation on Congress' power to displace state law in the
context of interstate commerce lies in the national political process.
536. See supra Section IV(C) (discussing magnet forum issues).
537. See supra note 450 and accompanying text. For another case in which the court conveniently
found a homogeneity of law in the choice of law determination, see In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
538. See ALl 1969 STUDY, supra note 489, at 401-04. The American Law Institute Study Pro-
ject on Complex Litigation is considering proposals that would direct the district court to such factors
as the law that would have governed any claims that were or might have been brought in the absence
of federal jurisdiction, the need for uniformity, and any possible inducements to forum shopping.
539. See generally 17 WRIGHT, MITLER & CooPER, supra note 175, §§ 4251-55 (discussing
principles of "Our Federalism"). If efficiency and economy were the only criteria, a federal statute
might attempt to assure maximum joinder and consolidation by insisting that all parallel state litiga-
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litigation over the existence of the jurisdiction. Perhaps the proposed fed-
eral complex litigation statute could be coupled with the elimination or
reduction of general diversity jurisdiction, as has been advocated in recent
years.54 The tradeoff would lessen the adverse impact upon federal work-
loads and, at the same time, lessen federal-state conflicts. In addition, it
would extend a federal forum to interstate cases in which the assertion of
diversity jurisdiction seems logical and is most needed to solve problems
that are national in character.
VII. CONCLUSION
After Shutts, potential personal jurisdiction over multistate class claim-
ants is broad. The Supreme Court has made the class action format eco-
nomically attractive to attorneys representing class members with small
claims as well as large ones. However, it is not clear whether Shutts will
expand the real availability of class actions, because the opt-out right may
undermine class inclusion or even destroy the mandatory class, at least in
damage cases. Furthermore, the decision means that prevention of abuses
will require careful use of the available procedural tools. For example,
courts should use their authority under Rule 23(d) to tailor notice to the
needs of the cases but, at the same time, they should be reluctant to recog-
nize exceptions to the binding effect of class decrees because of notice
defects.
The serious theoretical issues of jurisdiction left open by Shutts include
those raised by multiple competing class actions, notice that is not intelli-
gible or not received, application of the Shutts requirements to federal
courts, and public policy exceptions to binding effect. These problems may
not affect resolution of the typical claim in the typical case, but they will
be significant concerns in some actions. Even more importantly, a court
hearing a multistate class action should address problems of forum abuse
with appropriate certification decisions and doctrines deferring to other
forums. Furthermore, the impact of Shutts upon mandatory class actions
is an extremely important question that remains to be determined. This
Article proposes a four-factor approach that would narrow use of these
actions, yet preserve them for situations whose resolutions are best accom-
plished through the mandatory class action device.
tion be merged with any action instituted under the new federal multiparty, multistate subject matter
jurisdiction. That bold an expansion of federal judicial power is questionable, however. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW § 3-39, at 147 (1978). One commentator suggests that states enter
into an agreement on interstate transfer and consolidation patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for multi-
ple cases involving a "common issue." See Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of
Nonparty Preclusion and an Alterniative Proposal, 67 IOWA L. REV. 917, 963-66 (1982).
540. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2D § 3601 (1984).
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The knottiest questions left open by Shutts, however, may be those con-
cerning choice of law. Although the Court's guidelines limit the worst
abuses, enough play in the joints remains to allow the magnet forum phe-
nomenon to persist. The multiplication of management problems and con-
flicts of interest that result from efforts to apply more than fifty sets of
laws also will put heavy pressure on even the most conscientious courts to
find consensus. Courts should address these concerns by careful use of
subclassing, orders for multiple counsel, or bifurcation; in addition, they
should refuse nationwide certification in favor of statewide or regional ac-
tions if management difficulties and federalism concerns outweigh the effi-
ciency gains of a nationwide class.
Although judicial evolution could generate solutions to these questions,
legislation is preferable. Proposals for multiparty, multistate jurisdiction
coupled with restrictions on traditional diversity jurisdiction probably
would result in a net reduction of federal workload and intersystem con-
flicts. Particularly if accompanied by provisions that legitimize mandatory
classes as well as other compulsory joinder techniques, and that govern
choice of law, legislation would go far towards rationalizing class action
practice after Shutts.
